Inspecting cloud storage via deniable attribute based encryption

Cloud storage services have become increasingly popular. Because of the importance of privacy, many cloud storage encryption schemes have been proposed to protect data from those who do not have access. All such schemes assumed that cloud storage providers are safe and cannot be hacked; however, in practice, some authorities (i.e., coercers) may force cloud storage providers to reveal user secrets or confidential data on the cloud, thus altogether circumventing storage encryption schemes. In this paper, we present our design for a new cloud storage encryption scheme that enables cloud storage providers to create convincing fake user secrets to protect user privacy. The deniability feature makes coercion invalid, and the ABE property ensures secure cloud data sharing with afine-grainedac- cesscontrol mechanism. Our proposed scheme provides a possible waytofightagainst immoralinterference with the right of privacy. Since coercers cannot tell if obtained secrets are true or not, the cloud storage providers ensure that user privacy is still securely protected.