



Full Length Research Article

BELEAGUERED ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN NEPAL

***Bishwambhar Ghimire and Muhammad Ashraf**

Department of Public Policy and Administration Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 15th February, 2016
Received in revised form
27th March, 2016
Accepted 15th April, 2016
Published online 31st May, 2016

Key Words:

Afno Manchhe;
Chakari;
Bureaucracy;
Corruption;
Administrative,
Reform.

ABSTRACT

Although a number of Reform Commissions formed over the years to strengthen public administration, recommended several initiatives to the government, the changes were largely neglected, and some of the initiatives could not even meet the critical needs. Lethargy and inept service are common, making the bureaucracy ineffective and incompetent. Public servants lack commitment and are overwhelmingly influenced by political parties and their ideologies. The traditional administrative process is still bogged down in longer procedures than necessary, and creating quicker services seems to always be latched to some form of corruption. *Afno Manchhe* (one's own people), *Chakari* (Sycophancy), political influence, and bribery are deeply rooted in Nepalese bureaucracy. This paper thus explores and evaluates the attempts of administrative reform and public service in Nepal since 1960s. The experience of globalization and new modes of communication have made the public vocal to raise questions about the accountability and effectiveness of public servants in Nepal. While public expectations are growing, the Nepalese public administration seems too slow to change itself. There is now a need to clarify political commitments and explore political-administrative interface.

Copyright©2016, *Bishwambhar Ghimire and Muhammad Ashraf*. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

INTRODUCTION

Nepal is located in South Asia, bordered to the north by the People's Republic of China, and to the south, east, and west by India. It is a landlocked country with an area of 147,181 square kilometers and a population of 30 million. Today the population growth rate is 1.35%, which is comparatively less than previously (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The Nepalese administrative system is basically divided into three levels including Central, Regional, and District Administration(s). These administrations provide public services to the citizens (ARC Report, 2014). However, there are no administrative systems and services in Nepal that have not been unaffected in the past by political turmoil, adversely affecting performance and management. The Nepalese bureaucracy is often characterized by *Afno Manchhe*¹,

and *Chakari*², corruption, prolonged delays, favoritism, lack of accountability, low level capability, and lack of commitment (Bista, 1991). Similarly, the patronage system is deeply rooted in the Nepalese government, and a game of power is endemic in the society. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (2011) reports, "power is concentrated in a small ruling elite, which is supported by a growing, intermediate-sized group of government officials, a growing upper-middle class, and merchants; and this power is not effectively checked by workers and peasants, who are the vast majority of the population." These elites handle the government system by diminishing rules and regulation that favors public servants. It involves "rent seeking, pork-barreling, position buying and selling, favoritism in appointments, and procure kickbacks" (Adhikari, 2015). Governance is based on "rule of man rather than the rule of law" that has encouraged "rampant nepotism and favoritism" (Nakamura & Koike, 1992, p. 489). Some groups are constantly power seeking, making own networks in the high levels of political and administrative personnel for their own benefit. They use public resources with the help of politicians and bureaucrats for their mutual remuneration.

***Corresponding author: Bishwambhar Ghimire,**
Department of Public Policy and Administration Ryerson University,
Toronto, Canada.

¹ *Afno Manchhe* is Nepalese popular phrase that used to indicate one's inner circle or own a person that reflects one's associates who can be approached whenever and whatever he/she needs

² *Chakari* is a cultural concept in Nepalese society that reflects the influence to the higher ranks political and administrative people by serving, appeasing, and offering valuable gifts

For that reason, most political appointments and high level bureaucratic nominations are done without any performance measurement and merit. These activities are possible on the basis of *Chakari*, which is common in Nepalese bureaucracy and politics (Adhikari, 2015). The Nepalese Bureaucracy is a hierarchical system that contributes to a unique class-culture in society. This system has created lots of problems in providing legitimate services and establishing accountability and effectiveness. One study states, “Weberian bureaucratic tradition; that is, hierarchical control of the bureaucracy, and this may result in a range of problems relating to performance management, including the fact that it does not capture the nuances of programs or services, and tends to emphasize efficiency over effectiveness” (Ohemeng and McCall-Thomas 2013, p. 460).

Nakamura & Koike (1992) state, “The quest for administrative reform emanates from crises in governance. Reform goes beyond exploring ways to improve the quality of public management” (p. 484). Active public servants and effective service are characteristic of sustainable development. However, effective civil service and administrative reforms in developing countries hardly ever get established. Stakeholders, scholars, and donors have raised the question of the efficiency of implementing reforms. Many have been tried to recognize a successful methodology that could help overcome the political problems in implementing any initiatives (Rinnert, 2015). Most of the studies show that “political commitment, bureaucratic heritage and administrative capacity to be main determinants of reform outcomes” (ibid, p. 22). Some historical administrative reform in the public governance has been attempted since the 1960s in Nepal. Several administrative reforms include the Administrative Reform Commission – 1968, Administrative Reform Commission – 1975, Administrative Reforms Commission – 1991, Governance Reform Program – 2001, Vision paper for Civil Service – 2007, and Administrative Reform Committee – 2014. All of the Committees and Commissions recommended initiatives to strengthen public administration to make public service more effective.

However, the recommendations were not explicitly implemented and the outcomes were consistently inadequate (ARC, Report 2014). This paper has some limitations because it is based on secondary information including reviews of literature from articles, books, reform reports, and other policy documents. Access to official data on public administration is difficult, and the data available online is not accessible after a period of time. Thus it is problematic for evaluating the accountability and efficiency of the public administration in Nepal. An official record keeping system does exist, but the scant available data is not very helpful for comparative studies. Yet, this research prepares a foundation for a further in-depth research based on fieldwork and primary sources.

What is the administrative reform and why is it important?

The term “Administrative Reform” represents the elimination of endemic problems in the present system and establishes a new improved system.

It includes interaction between politics and administration for the betterment of public services. It is not only an initiative to strengthen services but also to foster better understanding between public servants and stakeholders (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). One study in 1988 indicated: “Administrative reform is a universal claim of contemporary societies, but strategies of general applicability for achieving such reform are far from being universally defined” (Jreisat, 1988, p. 85). Public administration is the fundamental organization of the state that implements public policies and accomplishes the activities of national development. However, it is only possible to achieve the goal of reform if bureaucracy is accountable, result-driven, people-oriented, effective, efficient, competent, and transparent (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993).

According to Caiden (1968), “Administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance. It is artificial because it is manmade, deliberate, and planned; it is not natural, accidental or automatic” (p. 349). He characterized reform into three features “moral purpose, artificial transformation and administrative resistance—gives administrative reform its distinctiveness” (p. 350). Reforms are not applied by reformers and then measured by their advocates; rather reform focuses on results rather than observation (Caiden, 1968). Thereby administrative reform seeks “to improve administrative capacity for efficient and effective performance” (Jreisat, 1988, p. 86). In addition, it is fundamental to make administration viable when the function of administration is inadequate (Caiden, 1968).

Public administration in Nepal is notorious for being too complex, rigid, centralized, delayed in decision-making, and adhering too rigidly to rules and regulations (Gautam, 2008). In the course of political change, the service delivery into the public of Nepal has been incapable but in need of change. Gautam in 2008 also stated, “Reform is necessary for improving quality of public services, making the operations of government more efficient, implementing public policies effectively and making public expenditure cost effective. Reform is deliberative changes in the structures and work processes of public organizations for better performance” (p. 4). Over the past two decades, as a result of technological innovation and the extensive advances in communication, Nepali citizens have started demanding more of their government manifested in better service, accountability, and improving the communication between public servants and citizens. People want a better civil service. The outrage of the public continues to increase, and the government has an obligation to reform.

Governance

Formal and Informal Governance: According to Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith (2002), formal and informal governance systems are found everywhere in the world. Both formal and informal systems exist side by side so that citizens and public servants can interact. They argued that while informal and traditional practices are also common in society, they could not rely on formal systems. However, it is quite difficult to detect and separate informal practices within formal institutions—practices which encourage corruption, and weakening the rules of law.

Public servants can be involved in policy making and decision making in informal governance that is not part of the explicit process. These factors make the decision-making process unpredictable. Typically, interest groups inevitably lead the entire process of policy making for their own personal interest and profit. The two systems differentiated are:

Formal Systems	Informal Systems
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Written and explicit • Readily observable • De-jure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unwritten and implicit • Less obvious and unidentified • De-facto

Source: Adhikari, 2015 (p. 13)

Informal governance easily undermines the administrative system of developing countries. In Nepal, the bureaucracy that is controlled by informal governance is an overwhelming burden to any initiative to achieve better results from public service. Despite the official administrative reforms to acquire improved accountability, it is necessary but very difficult to eradicate informal governance.

Administrative Culture: The administrative culture is also a characteristic of bureaucracy. It is a part of political culture that does not subsist in separation “from the rest of the society” (Dwivedi et al., 1999, p. 22). Culture signifies the entire society comprising of politics, public administration, and citizens. Dwivedi et al. argued, “If you can’t change the culture of an entire society, you will not be able to reform or modernize its administration” (p. 22). Existing old cultural mindsets are a part of the problem in improving services in the Nepalese administration. Thus, reform cannot be a solution for good governance without affecting some local cultural norms. The Nepalese administration is a culture within itself. Jamil & Dangal (2009) stated that “administrative culture as understood is the values, norms, and attitudes held by bureaucrats as manifested in interpersonal relationship within the organization and how they relate to that environment”.

There are “socio-cultural values” spread in Nepalese society that “reflects a strong hierarchical tradition, cast orientation, differentiated rank and status, equal distribution of privileges and amenities based on family and social backgrounds, and fatalism” (Jamil & Dangal, 2009, pp. 202-203). In addition, Nepalese bureaucracy is connected to various political parties, which in turn influence their political values. They want to protect and endorse their personal interests by affiliating to their political camp rather than to the professional administrative culture. Nepalese public administration is characterized by patron-client relationships, informal groupings, and political affiliated and unresponsive public services that are the barriers of the good governance (ibid).

Performance management: Performance management is directly associated with input, output, and outcomes. A study (2006) mentioned that input is related to employees, materials, and other resources; output is associated with effort; and the outcome is known as the achievement(s). Performance management always seeks to identify problems and enhance accountability. Accountability is a major concern of government in any country, because government is the principal organization of public policy. Any government has the major responsibility to bestow public services effectively.

The writer mentions that customer satisfaction is the test of better performance in public administration since customers are the citizens, public and private organizations, and the businesses. A good government tries to satisfy its customers by providing effective and efficient public services. The government should receive feedback of customers and adjust accordingly (Thomas, 2006).

Thus, performance measurement is significant to implement reform initiatives in the public administration. Performance management is designed to achieve better efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in any organization (Ohemeng & Thomas, 2013). This includes economic monitoring, program evaluation, service delivery, and employee efficiency. Thomas studied about the public sector performance management and came to the conclusion with this slogan: “If you cannot measure it, you cannot manage it” (Thomas, 2007, p. 2). Thus, performance management is essential in any public administration and plays a vital role for change. The Government of Nepal claims to have started to evaluate and improve the performance of public employees by providing an effective performance award to high-level bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the overall performance of public employees remains the same, indicating that the work ethics and culture remain unchanged.

Classical and Modern Approaches to Public Administration

It is fundamental to understand the different approaches to public administration while we study the reform of administration. Weber, Wilson and Taylor are the dominant authors of classical approach to public administration in the twentieth century. The most important theory of the classical approach to public administration was the direct control of hierarchy and accountability of civil servants--only to their superiors. It is also known as the traditional approach. The theoretical principle of the traditional model of Weber is critical. He focused on the “social and historical context of public administration, and more particularly, bureaucracy” (Katsamunskas, 2012, p. 76). He stressed a system of control through hierarchy from top to bottom that was based on a set of rules and regulations. In addition, he incorporated the employment in the bureaucratic organization of defining their roles, responsibility, and incentives including the process of appointment. Moreover, Wilson “introduced the political-administrative dichotomy” (ibid, p.76) whereby he focused on a separation between politics and administration. He argued that this separation helps to control corruption in any given level. Common sense would suggest it seems to be true, but in reality it’s quite difficult to separate them adequately (ibid). Any political value in Nepalese bureaucracy that has supported corruption in the bureaucracy is deeply rooted. There might be a solution in the Wilson principle that could play a crucial role to control corruption. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the New Public Administration movement was initiated with the slogan of “participation, decentralization, and representative bureaucracy” (Katsamunskas, 2012, p. 77). Participation referred to the political and organizational process that incorporated citizens’ involvement in governance and separation of power within the organization.

Decentralization was focused on the citizens' attachment in "governmental and organizational processes" (ibid, p. 78). Representative bureaucracy was known as citizen-centered service delivery (ibid). Thereby, new public administration was to become a major part of the reform during that period, in most developed countries in the world. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was growing criticism of this traditional approach, and new waves of reform came in and redefined the new public administrative management. Anglo-American countries' reforms were seen as breakthroughs. The new approach to public management was focused on results, output, outcomes, accountability, responsibility, and performance (Katsamunskas, 2012). In the United Kingdom and United States, reform was introduced at all levels of government to implement "economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" (ibid, p. 79). In 1992, American presidential candidate Bill Clinton was interested "in reforming government through changing the culture of the American Federal Government" (ibid, p. 79). The UK, USA, Australia, and New Zealand adopted an approach of "marketing and privatizing" (ibid, p. 79). Meanwhile in the Nepalese Administration of that day, several reform commissions were formed, following the global trends; unfortunately these reforms were ineffective.

Administrative Reform History

The global trend of administrative reform has been seen prominently since the early 1950s. It is distinguished with a fundamental component of 'developmental process' Caiden (1973). He stated, "Administrative delays and obsolescence and the consequent need for administrative 'surgery' and 'therapy' are world-wide problems..." (p. 328). Many developing countries including Nepal also seemed to follow the global trend of administrative reform that revealed administrative revolution for radical changes (ibid).

The history of the Nepalese public service began as early as 1760s. The King and the Royal Palace had the central role of appointing public servants in different branches and departments. Today, the history of attempted administrative reform in Nepal has stretched for six decades. After the political changes in 1951 with the promulgation of a new constitution, King Tribhuvan came to power. He introduced a restructuring committee under the name of the Butch commission in 1952. Following this, the Prime Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya headed the Administrative Reforms Planning Commission in 1956. The government promoted reform prominently since the early 1960s with the intent of a result-oriented public administration (ARC, 2014).

This paper focuses on the administrative reforms only after 1960. After this period, some reform initiatives were seen during the direct rule of monarchy³, albeit was largely ineffective. The Panchayat-regime⁴ wanted to promote reform rather than real change in the administration. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, the political administrative awareness of the population had increased. Stakeholders, political leaders, parliamentary members, non-government organizations, and donors watched the public service more

closely and calls for accountability pressured the government to improve. Since then, the purpose of reforms has been redefining the role of the government, strengthen public administrations, increase productivity and accountability, and change the administrative capture in Nepal (ARC Report, 2014).

Panchayat Regime (1960-1990)

The political system under the direct rule of the King was known as Panchayat Regime, which remained in the governance more than 30 years. The system was established by defeating the democratic popular elected government in 1960 that was oriented towards the dictatorial politics in the country. The dictatorial government of the King imposed a restriction of political activities in the society. The administrative system was anticipated to be non-political and completely obedient towards the *Panchayat System*⁵. But the public administration was more loyal and respectful towards the *Panche*⁶ rather than public service. A New District Officer (CDO) was established that was the central office of administration and development. Administrative organizations were restructured. In the course of restructure, the *Palace Secretariat*⁷ was established to influence the bureaucracy. The post secretariat was appointed by the government on the basis of patronage rather than merits system (ARC Report, 1992). The Panchayat Administrative System had aimed to decentralize the development processes and maintain the public services fairly; so the administrative structure was reformed dividing into 5 development regions, 14 Zones, and 75 Districts. In addition, two administrative reform commissions were formed: Jha Commission⁸ 1968 and Thapa Commission⁹ 1975 were formed that were looking for recommendation to make civil service efficient, effective, and complete (Dangal, 2005; ARC Report, 1992).

Jha Administrative Reform Commission (1968) studied the existing administrative system and recommended improved enforcement to the government. The Commission identified some "administrative structures on the basis of the principle of decentralization; psychological change, encouragement and security of service of civil servants; strengthening the public service commission (PSC); provision of an administrative court; clear distinction of functions, duties and rights between administration and *Panchayat* and so on" (Dangal, 2005, p. 44). The Commission determined some issues and made recommendations of which some were put into practice. For example the "Performance Evaluation System, strengthening the role of public service commission, arrangement for a code of conduct for civil servants to maintain their sincerity towards king and the political system were the major achievements of the Commission" (ibid, p. 43). During this period, the bureaucracy was powerful and influenced the educated elite in society.

⁵ *Panchayat System* was a dictatorial system adopted by the King during the periods 1960-1990.

⁶ *Panche* was known as the member of *Panchayat System*. They influenced the administration during the period

⁷ *Palace Secretariat* is the chief of bureaucracy who was appointed by the government of *Panchayat*

⁸ Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) was formed in 1968 under Bedananda Jha by the autocratic government of the King

⁹ Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) was formed in 1975 under the Dr. Bhes Bahadur Thapa by the autocratic government of the King

³ Absolute power was with the Nepalese Monarch from 1960 to 1990.

Monarchy was abolished in 2008 by the Nepalese Constituent Assembly

⁴ During Panchayat regime, the King of Nepal ruled directly (1960-1990).

They had been given more power to make plans for the development of the nation. They were linked with the higher levels of the Monarchy, so they dominated society. They could manipulate and concocted an environment for their own favor. As a result the service providing system was lethargic and inept. Rampant corruption was common in the public administration and public servants. People could not see positive change. At the same time, the government established *Janch Bhujh Kendra*¹⁰ to evaluate the efficiency of the public service in 1970. It was aimed to improve the promotion system in the civil service and the training policy. In addition, a "Group Classification System" (Dangal, 2005, p. 44) was introduced in 1971 that purposed the systematic appointment, transfer, and promotion of the civil servants (ibid).

Administrative Reform Commission (Thapa Commission, 1975) was the same as the previous one. The Commission also proposed recommendations to improve administrative machinery. According to the recommendation, "planning cells in the ministries were reorganized with the task of formulating, evaluating and monitoring the planning functions and serving as a liaison between the operating ministry, the PSC, and the Finance Ministry" (Dangal, 2005, p. 44). In addition, the commission proposed to establish an Administrative Staff College, and that was established in 1982. In spite of different administrative reform, the bureaucracy was not effective, nor efficient or transparent. The government still remained only with its vested interest to bolster the Monarchy rather than implement real change (ibid). The government maintained the *Panchayat Regime* as long as they could, and civil servants remained largely as irresponsible servants. Vested interests remained. The government pretended receiving some recommendations from different commissions to accelerate improved civil service and development, but did not implement them. There remained a gap between government and bureaucracy, which directly adversely affected the people. There were even recommendations that could never be implemented; for example, "set up the Ministry of Human Resource and General Administration, strengthen planning units, simplify work procedures, and form office of the Account General" (Gautam, 2008, p. 6).

After the Restoration of Democracy 1990

"The people's movement of 1990 restored the democratic political regime" that changed the political system from a dictatorial to a democracy (Gautam, 2008, p. 8). After the restoration of democracy, the administrative reform was essential and a primary concern for making a change in the public sector. In the aftermath, several reforms were made.

Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) 1991 was established under the Prime Minister to "identify weakness of administration" (Dangal, 2005, p. 45). The government was directly involved in restructuring of the administration. The commission recommended several reform measures such as "redefining the role of government, public service, restructuring public organizations, right-sizing bureaucracy,

privatization of power and authority to the line agencies, human development, corruption control, modifications on performance appraisal system and monitoring of reforms" (Gautam, 2008, p. 8). These recommendations were expected to be implemented within three years. However, most of the recommendations remain unimplemented even in the present (Shakya, 2009).

Administrative Reform Management Committee (ARMC) 1992 was formed on the basis of ARC 1991's recommendation. It was "recommended to reduce the number of civil servants to 77,000 by end of fiscal year 1993/94 from the then level of 102,744; but subsequently it has reverted back to the earlier level" (Shakya, 2009, p. 42). Similarly, the committee recommended downsizing the number of ministries from 21 to 18, placing a code of conduct in every government office, with frequent monitoring, strengthening corruption control mechanisms, decentralizing the administrative works, and developing high level management in public administration (ARC Report, 2014). The implementations of reform initiatives were the same as previous commissions. All recommendations were tabled, but stymied in application.

Governance Reform Program (GRP) 2001 was formed with the help of the Asian Development Bank's soft loan assistance in making bureaucracy accountable, result-oriented, and "gender-responsive". In other words, GRP oriented five main principles: A) "to develop an internal capacity for leading reform, B) to improve efficiency of the civil service, C) to enhance over all competence and motivation of civil servants, D) to improve governance and reduce corruption in government, and E) to improve performance of the key Ministries of the government" (Gautam, 2008, p. 9). But like previous reform initiatives, some recommendations were at best partly implemented, while others were never implemented (ibid).

Vision Paper for Civil Service (2006) was made for a ten-year plan, after the restoration of a democratic political regime. King Gyanendra suspended the elected government in 2001 and established a monarchy. However, the autocratic regime in Nepal did not last long and was overthrown by *Jana Andolan - II, 2006*¹¹ (Democracy Movement). A Vision paper aimed to modernize Nepalese public service under the new Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala. During the authoritarian regime, the public administrative reform was to modernize public services. The Vision Paper Task Force allocated different initiatives such as "find out core areas and non-core areas of governance; make civil service client oriented, accountable and responsive" and submitted to the government in April 2007 (Gautam, 2008, p. 11). People had high expectation after the restoration of democracy, but these initiatives have still not been implemented yet. Caiden (1999) stated, "Reforms need strong political backing, mass support, and competent inside facilitation" (p. 815). A trustworthy mechanism and strong political support in monitoring the reform initiatives and programs and administrative reforms could still not be found in Nepal.

¹⁰ *Janch Bhujh Kendra* was a center of investigation that was established in the Royal Palace during the Panchayat regime

¹¹ *Jana Andolan-II* is the People's Movement against the monarchy. It is also known as Democracy Movement 2006 (Loktantrik Andolan).

High-Level Administrative Reform Committee (2014) was formed to identify legal, political and structural barriers for the amelioration of public services. A political system in the country had ended and the new constitutional guarantees of the political system had not yet been established. Several problems were raised such as increased corruption, lack of public accountability, unstable political situation, and inefficiency.

The committee started to work and recommended several reform measures stressing an improved public administration that was more dynamic, accountable, result-oriented, and transparent. The report focused on a reduction in the number of government ministries from 27 to 18. It mentioned the need to strengthen institutions, improve public corporation, touched on ways to achieve better governance, diversity management, and staff trade unions. The report suggested the introduction of a security system, a foreign policy, and a training provision of federal administrative structure. In addition, there should be an existing organizational structure, law, and policy issues for accountable public administration (ARC Report, 2014). After the restoration of a democratic multiparty system in 1990, it was given extensive effort to establish civil service reforms, but they failed in practice. Looking back, there is not even enough collective reflection regarding how reforms can fail. Some literature has indicated that the designing and implementing of reforms--by the political elite--could never be effective. A dearth of strong political will and inadequate supports from bureaucracy also contribute in the failure of any reform initiatives.

Conclusion

There is a great dilemma in the implementation of reforms in Nepal. It is argued that Western countries have had similar problems. Administrative recommendations of American presidential commissions since the 1930s, and British Administration reforms since the 1950s were largely failures of administrative reform in the beginning (Jreisat, 1988). Similar to the international scene, various administrative reforms in Nepal have been attempted to modernize civil service over a period of six decades. However, most of the administrative reforms were upset. One study stated that, "If an administrative system were capable of being changed easily, there would be no need for reform at all. The fact is that administrative systems are difficult to transform, apparently even more difficult than political and economic systems" (Caiden, 1999, p. 820). Administrative reforms are perhaps just documents to convey an image to the public and not for serious implementation. It is easy to understand that reform does not function itself; there needs to be strong desire of politicians and bureaucrats to implement initiatives. Administrators need to re-evaluate their ethics in providing effective service. However, even if reforms and initiatives are accepted, bureaucrats are still notoriously slow in providing improved services.

The accountability of public servants is more important than merely providing answers to maintain a good image. Accountability is a strategy "by which public agencies and their workers manage the diverse expectations generated within and outside the organization" (Romzek and Dubnick,

1987, p. 228). Maintaining quality service and corruption control is the result of effective accountability. The Nepalese public administration is recognized as one of the most corrupt institutions in South-Asia. Royal Norwegian Embassy, Anti-corruption Interventions in Nepal (2015) stated "Transparency International's (TI) corruption barometer report of 2013 revealed ugly statistics. 57% of survey respondents found that corruption had increased in Nepal over the past two years, while 69% indicated corruption as a very serious issue in the public sector of Nepal" (p. 1). *Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2014* showed that Nepal is placed in a dismal 126th position out of 175 countries. The corruption was aided by a state controlled economy before 1990, and after the restoration of democracy in 2006, the governance relied on negotiations rather than following rules of law, all which fostered corruption (ibid). In conclusion, a fundamental change of the political context and an increase in the power of Nepalese citizens is necessary. Public administration needs to be competitive and capable of meeting international standards. An improvement in relationships between politicians and administrators also play a vital role in making civil service efficient in any developing country such as Nepal. This is only possible when there are solid political commitments. A measure of cooperation within political parties would aid greatly to meaningful reforms. Performance management in one form or another should be implemented to increase productivity and accountability. The measuring tools for such include accessibility, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and relevant practices in the administration.

REFERENCES

- Adhikari, S. 2015. Patron-Client Politics and Governance System in Nepal. Unpublished thesis submitted to Master of Public Administration Seoul National University. Retrieved from <http://dms.nasc.org.np/sites/default/files/documents/PatronClient%20Politics%20and%20Governance%20System%20in%20Nepal.pdf>
- ARC. 1992. Report of the Administrative Reform Commission (in Nepali). Department of Printing and Publishing, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, Nepal. Retrieved from <http://www.moga.gov.np/main/index.php/approvedreports-directives/2015-06-24-09-36-12>
- ARC. 2014. *Report of the Administrative Reform Committee* (in Nepali). Department of Printing and Publishing, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, Nepal. Retrieved from <http://www.moga.gov.np/main/index.php/approvedreports-directives/2015-06-24-09-36-12>
- Bankerhoff, D. W. and Goldsmith, A. A. 2002. Clientelism, Partimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda: U. S. Agency for International Development. Retrieved from <http://Users/user/Desktop/MPPA%202nd%20Semister/Pub%20Admin%20&%20Goverane/7%20Final%20Paper/Possible/Formal%20and%20Informal.pdf>
- Bista, D. B. 1991. Fatalism and Development: Nepal' Struggle for Modernization; Delhi: Orient Longman. Retrieved from <https://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=JzFROpFVYRAC>

- Brunsson, Nills and Johan P. Olsen. 1993. *The Reforming Organization*, Routledge, London and New York. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2393993?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Caiden, G. E. (1999). Administrative reform -- proceed with caution. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 22(6), 815-832. doi:10.1080/01900699908525406
- Caiden, G. E. 1968. Administrative reform. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 34(4), 347-354. doi:10.1177/002085236803400404
- Caiden, G. E. 1973. Development, administrative capacity and administrative reform. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 39(4), 327-344. doi:10.1177/002085237303900401
- Central Bureau of Statistics. 2012. *National Population and Housing Census 2011 (National Report)*. Kathmandu: Central Bureau of Statistics.
- Dangal, R. 2005. *Administrative Culture in Nepal: Does it reflect the dominant socio-cultural values of Nepal?* Unpublished thesis for the Master of Philosophy in Public Administration; Department of Administration and Organization Theory University of Bergen. Retrieved from <http://www.ub.uib.no/elpub/2005/h/701002/Masteroppgave.pdf>
- Dwivedi, O. P., Gow, J. I. abd Institute of Public Administration of Canada. 1999. *From bureaucracy to public management: The administrative culture of the government of Canada* Broadview Press.
- Gautam, B. 2008. *Poor Performance of Leading Institutions: Setback to Improve public Governance; An Assessment of Administrative Reforms in Nepal*. Retrieved from http://www.napsipag.org/pdf/BHARAT_GAUTAM.pdf
- Governance Reforms Program. (2001-2005). *Policy Documents*, Kathmandu. Government of Nepal. Retrieved from <http://www.moga.gov.np/main/index.php/approvedreports-directives/2015-06-24-09-36-12>
- Jamil, I. and Dangal, R. 2009. The state of bureaucratic representativeness and administrative culture in Nepal. *Contemporary South Asia*, 17(2), 193-211. doi:10.1080/09584930802346497
- Jreisat, J. E. 1988. Administrative reform in developing countries: A comparative perspective: SUMMARY. *Public Administration & Development (1986-1998)*, 8(1), 85.
- Kathyola, J. 2010. *The political-administrative interface. The key to good public sector governance and effectiveness in Commonwealth Africa*. Retrieved from file:///Users/user/Downloads/The%20Political%20Administrative%20Interface.pdf
- Katsamunska, P. 2012. *Classical and Modern Approaches to Public Administration. Economic Alternatives*, issue 1. Retrieved from http://www.unwe.bg/uploads/Alternatives/BROI_1_ECONOMIC_ALTERNATIVES_ENGLISH_2012-06.pdf
- Nakamura, A. and Koike, O. 1992. Responsible governance and problems of administrative reform: Experiences of developing countries in Asia. *Governance*, 5(4), 484-492. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.1992.tb00054.x
- Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. 2011. *Corruption and Anti-corruption in Nepal: Lessons Learned and Possible Future Initiatives*. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Corporation.
- Ohemeng, F. and McCall-Thomas, E. 2013. "Performance Management and 'undesirable' Organizational Behaviour: Standardized Testing in Ontario Schools", *Canadian Public Administration*, 56(3), 456-77.
- Rinnert, D. 2015. The politics of civil service and administrative reforms in Development—Explaining Within-Country variation of reform outcomes in Georgia after the rose revolution. *Public Administration and Development*, 35(1), 19-33. doi:10.1002/pad.1709
- Romzek, B. S. and Dubnick, M. J. 1987. Accountability in the public sector: Lessons from the challenger tragedy. *Public Administration Review*, 47(3), 227-238.
- Royal Norwegian Embassy, Nepal. 2015. *Anti-Corruption Interventions in Nepal: Policy, Practices and Possible Collective Interventions*. Kathmandu, Nepal. Koirala, B. P., Khadka, K. & Timsina, Y.
- Shakya, R. K. 2009. *Why Civil Service Reforms Fail? - Case of Nepal*. *Administration and Management Review*, Volume 21, No.2, August
- Thomas, P. G. 2007. *Why Is Performance-Based Accountability So Popular in Theory and Difficult in Practice?* Paper presented to the World Summit on Public Governance: Improving the Performance of the Public Sector. Taipei City.
- Thomas, P.G. 2006. *Performance Measurement, Reporting, Obstacles and Accountability: Recent Trends and Future Directions*. Canberra: The Australian National University E Press.
- Vision Paper of the Civil Service. 2007. *Report, Vision Paper Task Force*, Kathmandu. Government of Nepal. Retrieved from <http://www.moga.gov.np/main/index.php/approvedreports-directives/2015-06-24-09-36-12>
