



## SOMALILAND AND SOMALIA PEACE- BUILDING PROCESS: ACTORS, INTERVENTIONS, AND EXPERIENCES

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### ABSTRACT

Somaliland and Somalia peace-building process has had some divergent experiences, actors and interventions. The reconciliation efforts in the peace-building initiatives in Somaliland, for instance, did not commence at the time Mohamed Siyad Barre's regime was defeated. It was the agenda of the Somali National Movement (SNM) to reconcile the clans which have been engaged in a long period of fighting since 1988-1990. This is subsequently facilitated the restoration of peace and stability in Somaliland. This process has also promoted traditional authorities and political actors to come together at a time the situation was very critical and devastating in Somaliland. In contrary, United Somali Congress (USC) in Mogadishu Somalia had immediately faced the new cycle of violent conflict, destruction and retaliations among clans. In fact, these new bloody civil wars were blamed on the USC which were split into two wings one was leading by General Mohamed Farah Aided and other led by Ali Mahid Mohamed. This has in the onset portrayed the scale of the problem in Somalia especially in Mogadishu. The international community response to the Somalia crisis contributed to the deterioration of violent conflict that sized many regions in Somalia in the post Siyad Barre period from 1991 onwards. This implies that external interventions in Somalia such as the deployment of peacekeeping forces of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) did not bring any solution to the longstanding problems in Somalia. Therefore, this paper aims to discuss the distinction and modalities between the peace-building process in Somaliland and Somalia and will attempt to raise these questions: who are the actors involved or leading the initiative of peace -building in Somaliland and Somalia?; how were the peace-building interventions conducted by considering the historical, social, cultural, religious and political organizations in both regions?; and what lessons and experiences can be learned.?

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### INTRODUCTION

The devastating violent conflict of Somalia is rooted in the injustice, inequality, favoritism and gross human rights violations that were committed by the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre. The Union established in 1960 brought enormous injustice and suffering to the people of the region.<sup>1</sup> There are a lot of dissimilarities between Somaliland and Somalia in terms of historical, political and social structures which the peace-building trajectory followed in the aftermath of the regime's collapse in 1991.

But, many external and domestic actors who were involved in the peace talks of both Somaliland and Somalia undermine these historical records which will be discussed subsequently in this paper. Moreover, it was indispensable for Somalia to demand international interventions, but many ordinary people in Somalia argue exclusively that external interference neither contributed to the peace-building process as clans and political reconciliations nor consolidated the efforts towards Somalia's stabilization agenda. But across the state building and peace building agenda, international assistance is fragmented,

<sup>1</sup> Resumé: AU Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland (30 April to 4 May 2005)

duplicative and confused, rendering the net result suboptimal.<sup>2</sup> Meddling in Somalia's affairs by external actors has been a chronic obstacle to peace.<sup>3</sup> Some intellectuals both Somalis and non-Somali are profoundly in dispute that the denial of the context-based approaches will never be successful and realistic as Somalia experienced for a long time. The claim that some external actors have a vested interest in perpetuating Somalia's state of war and collapse is very popular in Somali circles and can, in its cruder variations, constitute a conspiracy theory.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the problems of Somalia cannot only be blamed on the interventions of external actors but problems of deeper proportion, which is another aspect this paper examines in order to unveil the challenges Somalia's peace-building process has encountered. Somalia remains an area where volatile and insecure conditions continue to motivate interventions,<sup>5</sup> there are various analysis revealed that Somalia insecurity implications triggered neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia to joint African Union Mission to Somalia AMISON where such frontline countries have never been welcomed due to the fear conflict of interest. Somalia's peace-building initiatives were not mostly driven by domestic actors due to huge fragmentation of social and political disintegration and the absence of the traditional elders' national ownership. As a result, the international community is accused that their interventions are not context-oriented and not based on the realities on the ground. In the meantime, the international community is also blamed of having conflicting of interests and viewpoints which made decision-making unreliable. This rendered Somalia's situation even more unpredictable and dire. Moreover, the growing influence of Somalia's neighboring states within African Union Mission to Somalia AMISON has damaged the mission's reputation among Somalis. These failings have not only further endangered AMISON personnel, they have also undermined the mission's effectiveness.<sup>6</sup> However, Somaliland took a drastically different strategy; that indigenous contribution be mobilized and harmonized on the basis of building and bargaining the restoration of peace and stability. This was locally-driven, locally-financed, and context-based agenda for the quest of peace and stability. Somaliland has made notable progress in building peace, security and constitutional democracy within its de facto borders<sup>7</sup>. In fact, the Somaliland model can teach the rest of Africa that African people are able to fix their problems without the western narratives of conflict resolution on peace-building. Although, Somaliland had taken preliminary but significant steps towards institutional and socio-cognitive standardization under Egal during the 1990s, the polity increasingly struggled to maintain this process during the first decade of the 21st century<sup>8</sup>. Thus, all

discourses of the conflict and peace-building in Somalia had been viewed as an agenda that the regional states in the Horn of Africa combined with the international community often should dictate and compete upon. To the contrary, Somaliland has remained more isolated but peaceful and recovering through building its home-grown peace-building process and conflict resolution modalities. This has led to the recognition of the traditional elders as peacemaking actors. Consequently, in the historical point of view (both pre-colonial and post-colonial), the traditional governance and strong customary practices were all central and convincing in Somaliland. However, Somalia had never succeeded in cultivating such home-grown traditional governance and locally adequate cultural horizons of pursuit to maintain peace and stability. It has been the practice of all successive governments since independence to incorporate clan leaders, and therefore clans, into the administration through the appointment of *caaqilo* (s. *caaqil*), *salaadiin* (s. *suldaan*), *Garaado* (s. *Garaad*) and *Ugaasyo* (s. *Ugaas*).<sup>9</sup> Some intellectuals like university students, academicians, Diaspora people, civil society members and business communities who participated in discussions towards the preparation of this paper revealed that the colonial differences between Britain and Italy had extensively made some dramatic effect on the social and political life style of Somaliland and Somalia. Somaliland was under the system of indirect rule the *Caaqil* acted and served as an intermediary, assisting in implementation of administration's policies.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, in Somalia, the insecurity, and on daily basis explosion, constrained the overall efforts of reviving the hope to maintain peace and stability in Somalia over the past three decades. The internationally sponsored peacekeeping missions deployed in Somalia for several times, like the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISON) operating since in 2007 have failed in most instances to institute peace. The Security Council resolution (2297) authorized Member States of the AU to maintain the deployment of AMISON up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017, and further adds that AMISON is authorized to take all necessary measures.<sup>11</sup> The externally led interventions of Somalia and political instability distorted the peace- building and state-building trajectory by resuming a cycle of violence and insecurity over the past decades in Somalia. Mohamed Abdalla Elmi, independent Somali intellectual argues that Somalia peace- building process was initially politicized. He further noticed that consecutive external interventions combined with a lot of money spent on conferences outside Somalia ended up with no substantial outcomes achieved, whereas in Somaliland, the clans directly invested in the peace process with their own resources as livestock.<sup>12</sup> From this viewpoint, many people interviewed like women, youth and Diaspora people argue that external actors are not unilaterally liable to the whole problems of Somalia since Somali politicians and traditional elders cannot maintain peace. This is

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, Security Council, 2013 Results of the Secretary-General's technical assessment mission to Somalia, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2093 (2013)

<sup>3</sup> Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD), Somalia: Path to Recovery Building a Sustainable Peace, 2004, <http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Somalia%20-%20Path%20to%20Recovery%20-%20final.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Ken Menkhaus, Mediation efforts in Somalia, 2007, Davidson College, <https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/109MediationeffortsinSomalia-April-2007.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Calleb Otieno Ongoma, Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Frank Khachina Matanga, Role Of External Actor Involvement In Somalia Peace Building Processes, 2016, International Journal of Recent Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (IJRSSH) Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp: (166-186), Month: April 2016 - June 2016, Available at: [www.paperpublications.org](http://www.paperpublications.org)

<sup>6</sup> Paul D. Williams with Abdirashid Hashi, Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia, 2016, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies

<sup>7</sup> International Crisis Group, SOMALILAND: TIME FOR AFRICAN UNION LEADERSHIP, Africa Report N°110 – 23 May 2006

<sup>8</sup> Dominik Balthasar, 2012, STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as

Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science

<sup>9</sup> Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions, 2002, Draft Only, <http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Jimcaale%20-%20APD%20Governance%20and%20Decentralisation%20of%20Institution.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Ibid

<sup>11</sup> United Nations – Security Council Resolution 2297(2016) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Mohamed Abdalla Elmi independent intellectual and human rights activist, 2017, Hargeisa, Somaliland

a contrary view against firm allegations of the external actors. United Nations agencies and other regional organizations came to Somalia to help the victims of the war and provide assistance to thousands of displaced people who were in desperate need of food, medicine and water.<sup>13</sup> It is obvious that there are prevalent assumptions on the part of both Somalis and non-Somalis that this model of top down peace-building and state-building trajectory failed and did not tackle the prolonged violent conflict of Somalia; something that cannot always be said of the inorganic, top-down state-building projects associated with national reconciliation conferences that have not only failed but have often undermined local politics in the process, leaving the country worse off than before.<sup>14</sup> What is different to understand is the apparent inability or reluctance of many foreign governments, international institutions and Somali politicians to recognize that they keep repeating the same mistakes.<sup>15</sup> From this standpoint, the paper dwells more on the drawbacks of the externally led peace-building process especially in a context that bloody conflict and political disintegration overshadowed Somalia. The regional states and international community raised arguments that Somalia cannot be a forgotten, considering that the country's problems like terrorism, refugees' influx of human trafficking, piracy and other insecurity measures have consequences on neighboring countries.

Civil war, insecurity and anarchic violence in much of the country combine with drought and famine sweeping through the Horn of Africa to threaten much of the surviving Somali population with further massive loss of life.<sup>16</sup> During the first civil war in the early nineties, the long period of statelessness and the current humanitarian crisis, urgent need exists for assistance to the civilian population of Somalia.<sup>17</sup> Somalia's crisis also needs in depth understanding, analytical thoughts, and competence of the local politicians. The reality of getting a better solution of sustainable peace in Somalia is still far-fetched and requires a lot of interdependent elements and patterns of the grass-root participation, ownership and full comprehension roadmap. A Somali proverb asserts, '*milil guud kii lama dhayo*' meaning if you need to cure a disease you first diagnose properly before ordering the prescription. Therefore, the indigenous model of Somaliland and recollection of the Somali history in general, can help in the understanding of the Somali contemporary history of peacemaking and peace-building. Somaliland's experience is a classical and encouraging signal for the rest of the Somali-speaking communities. Many Somalilanders as politicians and normal citizens strongly believe that the way Somaliland has restored its peace is empirical and remains living experiences. International observers ascribed the alleged uniqueness and apparent success of its state-building project to process of traditional reconciliation, grassroots, the blending traditional and modern form of governance into so-called hybrid political

orders.<sup>18</sup> Although it is not recognized internationally, Somaliland has a growing economy and a democratic political system which works better than many others on the continent.<sup>19</sup> Somaliland's peace-building process was voluntary. Grass-root communities played a leading role in developing a peace-building compact, including the creation of a state that all constitutes endorse, in order to safeguard the law, order, and prevent violent conflicts. However, Somaliland has also faced challenges that threatened to destabilize the country. "The restoration of peace and stability was a collective responsibility in Somaliland both politicians and normal citizens participated making peace and preventing violent conflict."<sup>20</sup> A well known Somali poet, Yusuf Osman Abdille (Shaacir), believes that Somaliland peace-building process succeeded because of three reasons: (a) local ownership and inclusivity of the process which all clans inhabitant in Somaliland participated (b) the duration was short because the peace-building conferences were hosted mostly by clans in the regions and districts in Somaliland and this short period of time pressured in every conference to be reached an outcome, (c) Somaliland traditional authorities have supremacy and credibility to resolve the social and political conflicts. "Somaliland and Somalia peace-building process had great distinctions primarily cultural difference is rooted by colonial style of governance which traditional elders as Aqils in Somaliland was formed during the British era 1884-1960."<sup>21</sup>

Hence, the absence of international recognition in Somaliland seemed to be posing more coherent challenges to peace-building and stability, but it curtailed the aspiration of all international interventions and competing interests. However, Somaliland which is a post-conflict society proved to empower the grass-root people to obtain the capacity to mitigate and manage any violent conflict that may harm local initiatives of the peace-building and conflict transformation arrangements. There is a range of issues of peacemaking and violent conflict prevention interventions that Somaliland alone handled within a short period of time. Political and social reconciliations were in the forefront in every attempt to peace-building, reconstruction, and demobilization. Rebuilding the devastated infrastructure and improving social and economic services were key incentives that fostered Somaliland to in place the foundation of long lasting peace and political stability. Somaliland's state-making process has been labelled 'unique', 'peaceful', 'democratic', and 'bottom-up.'<sup>22</sup> Laying the foundation of the workable governance style as multi-party political system was commended by the international community who dedicated to the peace-building and state-building process in Somaliland and Somalia. Therefore, it is remarkable to mention that traditional elders in Somaliland worked as alternative governance throughout history and they were inevitable actors in Somaliland's modern history of post-

<sup>13</sup> Calleb Otieno Ongoma, Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Frank Khachina Matanga, Role Of External Actor Involvement In Somalia Peace Building Processes, 2016, International Journal of Recent Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (IJRSSH) Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp: (166-186), Month: April 2016 - June 2016, Available at: www.paperpublications.org

<sup>14</sup> Ken Menkhaus, 2006, Governance without Government in Somalia, Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping, *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 74-106

<sup>15</sup> Mary Harper – Getting Somalia Wrong – Faith, war and hope in a shattered state, African arguments, 2012

<sup>16</sup> Amnesty International – Somalia – A Human Rights Disaster, 1992

<sup>17</sup> Bjorn Moller, The Somali Conflict – the Role of External Actors, 2009, Diis-Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

<sup>18</sup> Dominik Balthasar, 2012, STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science

<sup>19</sup> Mary Harper – Getting Somalia Wrong – Faith, war and hope in a shattered state, African arguments, 2012

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Abdiqadir Abdirahman Ismail independent scholar and researcher, 2017, Hargeisa, Somaliland

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Yusuf Osman Abdille (Shaacir) poet and independent intellectual 2017

<sup>22</sup> Dominik Balthasar, 2012, STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science

conflict and peacemaking agenda setting. The first crucial task the elders picked was reconciliation and confidence building between communities whose relations has been damaged by the war.<sup>23</sup> “Somaliland peacemaking and peace- building process were all decided by the communities’ elders, not the state each clan has an elder or elders who may decide either war or peace.”<sup>24</sup> The grass-roots thus actively participated in the quest of peace-building and conflict transformation. Such efforts included the reduction of widespread insecurity and outbreak of civil wars, the Guurti peacemaking and peace-building interventions were all fundamental and durable. Reflections on Somaliland’s perspective on peace and development in the last 20 years show that the traditional elders played the central and legitimate role in creation of peace in Somaliland.<sup>25</sup>

## Background

The Somali Republic was born in 1960 with the merger between the Somaliland British Protectorate and Italian Somalia. It is inescapable to mention that the problem of Somalia started in the beginning of the attempted union. The nationalist fervour with which the North rushed into union with the South in 1960 quickly turned to disappointment and dissatisfaction when it became apparent that their voice in the government of the Republic was marginal.<sup>26</sup> Somali politicians, scholars and traditional elders argue that the integration of the two states was not appropriately managed. They further argue that the merger failed in its inception and it led to the political disintegration and social polarization of the country. The administrative apparatus was also characterized by discrepancies between north and south.<sup>27</sup> During the establishment of the merger of the two states, there had been strong political and social emotions of Somali irredentism attached with Pan Africanism concept which pushed for the people of Somaliland to advocate enthusiastically the merger and the establishment of the greater Somali Republic in the Horn of Africa. As observed earlier, the roots of the Somali culture of conflict should be sought in colonial history and troubled state which obtained in the immediate post-independence period.<sup>28</sup> The idea of a Greater Somalia had a uniquely emotional interest for Somaliland following a shock announcement early in 1955 that British Government had signed an agreement with Ethiopia to cease administering 25,000 square miles (65, 000 kilometres) of Somaliland grazing lands to the south and southwest to Somaliland’s border with Ethiopia.<sup>29</sup> Unfortunately, the anticipated union between Somaliland and Somalia had not succeeded to create a viable state of the Somali Republic. The people of Somaliland boycotted the provisional constitution of the Somali Republic as spelt out in the 1961 national referendum. In 1969, the coup of Mohamed Siyad Barre further contributed to the political

disintegration in the Somali Republic where people from Somaliland particularly faced more oppression, atrocities, injustice and economic segregation. During the failed union the people of Somaliland not only encountered political marginalization but complete isolation, they became the second class of citizens and finally experienced ethnic cleansing.<sup>30</sup> The social equality and citizenship replaced by nepotism and favoritism. In the meantime, it is irrefutable that Somali Republic had not collapsed in 1991 but the political disintegration rooted since the formation of the Somali Republic. Its flag has five stars, meaning that all Somali territories will have a one nation state and this concept of statehood did not take into account that European colonial partition in the Horn of Africa was totally irrevocable legally. Indeed, the choice of a five pointed white star on a light blue background as the national flag was a reference to the five countries among which the Somali people and their lands had been divided.<sup>31</sup>

The colonial legacy has contributed to a political identity crisis across the Somali-speaking communities because it is difficult to differentiate Somalis that live in Kenya, Somaliland, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia since they share kingship, religion, language, and clan. They also share some cultural and historical ties and the intermarriage factors establish more social linkages and supportive environment to each other. Therefore, seeking unification was merely difficult and obscured the regional stability and economic development. In view of this imposed partition, it was hardly surprising that the Somali was born to be irredentist, i.e. with the ambition of unifying all the Somali nation into one nation state.<sup>32</sup> But the reality was that the Somali Republic faced tremendous challenges to implement in this notion of statehood that has intimidated the colonial decision of partition. This Somali nationalism also undermined the merger between Somaliland British protectorate and Italian Trust territory of Somalia. These were the only two states that accepted the unification aimed at attracting the rest of the three regions of Djibouti Somaliland, Somaliland Ethiopia and Kenya Somali region. Somalia’s irredentist agenda, which first emerged in the late 1950s, acquired a new momentum with the coming to power of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1969.<sup>33</sup> History also portrays that the Somali Republic was born alongside the Cold War era. It is suggested that during this period, international politics exploited underdeveloped countries located in the strategic military sites. This bipolar international politics between competing Soviet Union and USA had enormous impact on the Somali Republic. Ironically, the 1977-8 Somalia-Ethiopian War, enabled by Soviet support, was the severing point in the friendship between the Cold War nations.<sup>34</sup> The Horn of Africa and in particular Somalia became a match – ball between the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the Somali region as a whole is also often subject to proxy war between Ethiopia and Egypt over utilization of the Nile waters. Dual

<sup>23</sup> Gedamu Kalewongel Minala, How did Somaliland emerge as a stable and peaceful polity, *International Commentary*, 2013

<sup>24</sup> Interview with Yusuf Osman Abdille (Sharci) poet and independent intellectual 2017

<sup>25</sup> Adam Haji- Ali Ahmed, Internal and External challenges to peace for Somaliland, *International Commentary*, 2013

<sup>26</sup> Ahmed M I Egal, Briefing Paper on Somaliland and Somalia, 2002

<sup>27</sup> Dominik Balthasar, 2012, STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science

<sup>28</sup> Dr. KINFE ABRAHAM, SOMALIA CALLING – Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace, 2000, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development

<sup>29</sup> Ministry of Information, Somaliland: Demand for International Recognition – A Policy Document of the Government of the Republic of Somaliland, www. Somalilandlaw.com

<sup>30</sup> Mohamed A. Mohamoud – Barawani, 2013, Somaliland’s Case is Historically, Politically, and Legally Justifiable

<sup>31</sup> Ahmed M I Egal, Briefing Paper on Somaliland and Somalia, 2002

<sup>32</sup> Bjorn Moller, The Somali Conflict – the Role of External Actors, 2009, Diis-Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

<sup>33</sup> Belete Belachew Yihun, Ethiopian professor writes about Ethiopia’s policy of destabilizing Somalia to “destabilization,” 1977 –1991, Somali News, 2017

<sup>34</sup> Mohamed A. Mohamed U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOMALIA: From Cold War Era to War on Terror, 2009, Graduate School of the State University at Buffalo

<sup>35</sup> Philipps Schulz, The Horn of Africa in a Bipolar World – THE Cold War as the Origin of the Somalia Crisis, 2016, URJHS Volume 10 Philipps University, Marburg, Germany, <http://www.kon.org/urc/v10/schulz.html>

Somali social characteristics (African and Arabs) may not also be ignored in this account.

### Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

This section examines how Somalis conceive or perceive what peace is all about in terms of their cultural, social customs, social values, spirituality and their daily behaviors. In this regard, there are also some international viewpoints about peace-building thematic interventions. Peace-building became a familiar concept with the UN following Boutros Boutros Ghali's 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace*, which defined peace-building as action to solidify peace and avoid relapse into conflict.<sup>36</sup> Johan Galtung also introduced some outstanding thoughts about peace-building and its range of coherent interventions 1964. In the Somali context, peace is defined as *Nabad baa naas lanuuga leh*, meaning peace has a nurturing bosom (or peace is nurturing). The traditional elders and indigenous communities also say peace and milk are always together: if there is no peace, there is no prosperity, peace is the shelter of everyone, and peace is the property of everybody. "Peace in Somali context is defined the possibility of living together at any cost."<sup>37</sup> Most Somali poems are often keen on promoting cohesion, commonality and compromise.

This is due to the importance of peace education and a need to mitigate violent conflicts. Because Somalis are pastoral and nomadic society who always fights over grazing, water resources and land. Somalis are rich in terms of literature of peace delivering through poems and songs and the most literature talking about how to maintain peace should subsequently demonstrate the level of emphasis and how the Somali culture stands for valuing for peace and Somalis strongly believe that peace is a precious, indispensable and at the heart of the society and state in general. One of the oldest Somaliland peacemakers Haji Abdi Hussein said "peace is our clothes, connected with our blood and shapes all our life of social, political, family, individual and cultural development." But, in observing the Somaliland and Somalia peace-building efforts, one can question why the root causes of the problems are not accurately examined and transformed. This is why there are many recurrent violent conflicts in both Somaliland and Somalia. Somaliland and Somalia peace-building attempts were constrained by the level of inadequate experience in peace-building to the extent that Somaliland and Somalia have lacked to carry out meaningful peace-building programs that can contribute to socio-political and economic transformations. This is associated with the inattention of the international community to deepen peace and stability for both states. Therefore, peace-building and conflict transformation efforts in these states require more resources and pragmatic leadership guided by local values and cultural preservation. Peace-building is a program designed to address the causes of conflict, the grievances of the past and to promote long-term stability and justice<sup>38</sup>. Moreover, Somalis are predominantly Muslims and the Islamic religion is the religion for peace, justice, solidarity and fairness.

Muslims are obligated to keep peace and the collective feeling of the society. Prophet Mohamed (peace be upon him) continually emphasized that peace is before any other deeds. Meanwhile, the Somali conflict is triggered by several issues. First, some cultural values such as marriage or heritage among clans and between clans; Second, camel is the most expensive property of the Somalis livestock generally and if one clan loots camel from another clan, this may create immediate violent conflict. Third, the revenge from clan to clan is also common due to the volatility and vulnerability of the environment. Indeed, ample evidence suggests that by the mid-1980s, Somalia was already a failed state. With the partial exception of the security sector, most government institutions began to atrophy in the years following the disastrous Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78.<sup>39</sup> The Somalis' social structure has more complex nature of inconsistency features regarding the compliance and resilience rule of law; on the one hand, clans' seek more independence in the light of customary performance and state support on the other. However, the Somali traditional elders are competent of leading any initiative of conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace-building interventions. This is done through the use of the customary system which mostly encourages consensus building.

A lot of narratives on the cultural myths and customary practices illustrate that Somalis have had a prominent conflict resolution and peacemaking tools for instance when elders come together under big "tree" as social platform was convincing and enhancing constructive engagement among society. In the contrary, scholars are challenging the notion that Somalis who are mostly nomadic people that value more individualistic concept of development which is called (Jees) meaning one single family not encouraging collectivity and the common interests of the nationwide. In the traditional setting, the African people were divided into two groups: land lovers and animal lovers.<sup>40</sup> As Abraham categorized African people and indicated that Somalis are animal lovers and this is true because the livelihoods of the Somali people wherever they are in Somaliland, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti do not appreciate the rule of law and political structures which may support the better life and better chance of the people due to their livestock freedom of movement which cross the borders from time to time. Traditional elders and politicians interviewed during the research singled out that Somali conflicts are characterized by a common symptom which is my "tribe" must always be the leading in the political and economic power due to fear of domination and revenge with other clans. Somalis are not qualified or lack some of the important traits of nationhood which includes tolerance, commonality, sharing, law and order and ensuring harmony and the culture of peace and friendship.<sup>41</sup> The Somali culture looks more violent; people are noisy, chaotic, hurried and make a lot of body movements when they are talking and even when enjoying their festivals. Those attributes disregard the discipline to respect the rule of law and as participant observer and as Somali citizen the researcher can testify that the Somali culture has many pros and cons comparatively and as Yuusuf Abdiile Osamn (Shaacir) a Somali poet says the Somali culture

<sup>36</sup> UN Peacebuilding: an orientation, 2010, [http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding\\_orientation.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/peacebuilding_orientation.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Yusuf Osman Abdalle (Shaacir) poet and independent intellectual 2017

<sup>38</sup> Katharina Schilling and Kulus Nzang, *Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation A Resources book – Youth Department of the Presbyterian Church in Cameroon*, 2012

<sup>39</sup> Ken Menkhaus, 2006, *Governance without Government in Somalia, Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping*, *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), pp. 74–106

<sup>40</sup> Dr. KINFÉ ABRAHAM, *SOMALIA CALLING – Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*, 2000, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development

<sup>41</sup> Interview with Mohamed Adam Ahmed scholar and intellectual based in Hargeisa, Somaliland, 2017

has bad faces but based on the circumstances always, people are more violent because of the nomadic paternalistic life style. Nonetheless, there are some interesting points which attracted and enriched the researcher's mind. A conversation with some credible intellectuals of academia, civil society, Diaspora and business sector from Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Garowe suggest that even Somalis abroad had neither changed their behavior of inner divisions of tribalism nor ever fully utilized the good practices from those developed countries they live in. Galtung in most of his work has sought to project positive peace as a higher ideal than negative peace. This is because according to Galtung, peace research shouldn't merely deal with the narrow vision of ending or reducing violent at a direct or structural level but seek to understand conditions for preventing violence.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, when one visits Ethiopia and Kenya, it is common to experience a great number of discrepancies between Somalis and those Ethiopians and Kenyan nationals. Hence, the anarchism behavior of the Somali people is indeed a constant threat to the rest of the region, prejudices and denial of the law and order are ultimately the root of misguiding and misinterpretation of the social well-being and human relations as whole.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, it is necessary to understand that Somali people across these countries had the same circumstance once upon time in terms of statehood and nation building scenarios and the failure of the viable state in the Somali Republic in the post-independence era was a key losing a political identity and trustworthy peaceful settlements and still the many part of the region in the Horn of Africa remain vigilant this precarious situation in Somalia.

### Restoring Peace and Stability of Somaliland and Somalia: Actors and Experiences

Somaliland and Somalia had shared conditions of restoring peace, stability and reviving the hope of the people. There were times as 1990- 1993 that both sides were empty handed where there was not a single state institution in existence to reinforce the law and order. The historical accounts show more bitter conditions and high vulnerability of the society engulfed by the civil wars and authoritarianism rule of one man and one family. Somaliland's experience with state and peace-building represents an important challenge to classical theories and practices of liberal peace-building. While in central and Southern provinces of Somalia the civil war proliferated.<sup>44</sup> The legacy of Mohamed Siyad Barre's dictatorship who ruled the Somali Republic from 1969- 1990 made a great negative impact on the political and social cohesion. During his rule, Somali communities were divided into clans where nepotisms, tribalism, corruption, unlawful arbitrary arrests and the killing of innocent people were all widespread across the Somali Republic. The people of Somaliland were especially subjected to these tyrannical acts which reached at the level of a genocidal considering the killing of thousands of innocent civilians. During the course of the 1988 civil war, 50,000 people were killed and another 500,000 were forced to flee

from their homes to Ethiopia. Government forces also laid over a million unmarked land mines in the Northern territory.<sup>45</sup> From this brief historical reflection, the rebel movements mostly SNM and USC inherited a devastated country and recollection from this catastrophic situation, the Somali National Movement (SNM) declared the independence of the Republic of Somaliland and the declaration was overwhelmingly celebrated by the people of Somaliland on May 18 in 1991. This imperative step made by SNM became an extraordinary move towards the restoration of peace and stability of Somaliland. Later on, many Somalis from South and Central Somalia accumulated in Somaliland as refugees, business people and as normal households because of the peace and security that Somaliland accomplished. In fact, what needs to be understood is why SNM succeeded while the USC failed in the peace- building process. Abdiwali Hassan Dirir, business man and independent intellectual based in Mogadishu, has revealed that there are two main distinctions of those rebel movements: (a) Somali National Movement (SNM) had enough time to achieve political maturity since it was established in 1981 - 1991 but USC was founded in 1989 almost closer to the Siyad Barre collapse (b) SNM was relied on traditional elders as Guurti and this has created a political culture of consensus and compromise." In South and Central of Somalia the traditional elders have no authority to resolve and genuinely represent the society while Somaliland is in the opposite because traditional authorities have prominent roles and responsibilities in the social and political life.<sup>46</sup> SNM formation was imminent due to increased pressures from the Siyad Barre regime authorities. However, the local uprising that took place across the main cities of Burao, Berbera and Hargeisa paved the way SNM fighters to gain more popular support from the public. In this regard, SNM built a political structure that has encouraged civic participation and democratic system of leadership rotating. Aftermath of the struggle against the regime of Siyad Barre, SNM had emphasized holding peaceful reconciliations that all clans in Somaliland participated to restore peace and solidarity. Following their defeat of the Barre forces in January 1991, the first task of the SNM leadership was to seek peace and reconciliation between the northern clans.<sup>47</sup>

Nevertheless, the normalization of the relationship between clans in Somaliland took a long time because there were armed militias that regularly disrupting the peace and security of Somaliland but the conferences held Berbera, 1991, Burao, 1991 and most important one in Borame 1993(sources Academy for Peace and Development, ADP), hugely contributed the restoration of peace, and resolving intra- clans conflicts. On the other hand, the traditional elders together with the government of Somaliland succeeded in the project of demobilization and disarmament by integrating and transforming the clans' militias and former SNM fighters into national army and police forces. It is often commented that Somaliland has succeeded in terms of reconciliation and state-building where other Somali areas have failed.

<sup>42</sup> Biljit Singh Grewal, 2003, Johan Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace, School of Social Science, Auckland University of Technology

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Abdirisak Diiriye Ahmed civil society activists based in Mogadisho, 2017

<sup>44</sup> Debora Valentina Malito, The liberal myth of neutrality and the Local Peace Process in Somaliland, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Paper Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Warsaw Workshop Number 3: Pragmatic Approaches to Peacebuilding, 2015, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/f89cb357-08cb-4737-bf48-7994e26d849e.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> A policy Document of the Government of the Republic of Somaliland (2001) *Somaliland's Demand for International Recognition*, [http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Government\\_Recognition\\_Paper\\_2001.pdf](http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Government_Recognition_Paper_2001.pdf)

<sup>46</sup> Abdiwahab Hassan Dirir business and intellectual based in Mogadishu, Somalia

<sup>47</sup> Academy for Peace and Development (APD), Consolidation and Decentralization of Government Institutions, 2002, Draft Only, <http://www.somali-jna.org/downloads/Jimcaale%20-%20APD%20Governance%20and%20Dcentralisation%20of%20Institution.pdf>

This is frequently, and apparently correctly, attributed to a sustained focus on resolving issues at a community-level before attempting to tackle issues such as national government.<sup>48</sup> In Somaliland, actors of peacemaking were all domestic led by the Guurti. But traditional elders as Garaads, Suldans, Boqors and Ugaas had dominant influence in restoring the peace and social reconciliation efforts, in order to cease the conflict among clans. The Guurti which was the House of Elders contained key prominent figures of all clans in Somaliland and the Guurti was the only inclusive legitimate organ both from political reconciliations and clan perspectives. Generally concentrating on the traditional authorities' institutionalized forum of the *guurti*.<sup>49</sup> Therefore, Somaliland's actors for peacemaking and peace-building stemmed from the privileged and respectable segment of the society including the traditional elders, religious leaders, business people, the Diaspora, civil society, women, urban and rural communities. In Somalia, however, there were many local and international actors and the division of the main rebel movement in Mogadishu, the USC, complicated the restoration of peace and the hope of the people. The SSDF, which was mainly dominated by Majerteen clan, took an initiative and pursued the Somaliland model of indigenous approach to peace-building and state-building as a result of which the semiautonomous region of Puntland was established peacefully. But in terms of a political organization, SSDF dissolved before the fall of Siyad Barre regime. The SSDF had disintegrated since 1985 due to internal strife caused by Colonel Yussuf Abdullahi's violent authoritarianism.<sup>50</sup> Though making Puntland state-building project was accompanied with reviving the political organization of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Mainly because of this, no external forces have ever been deployed in this region. Interview with Nour Shire Osman, chairman of Puntland's civil society, who believes that Puntland survived due to engaging its model of traditional mechanisms of peace and conflict resolution. "Puntland is a part of Somalia's Federal Government, but we are completely different from the South and Central of Somalia regarding the peace-building, actors and experiences, traditional elders have high caliber and respected."<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, the actors in Somaliland and Somalia for peace showed a distinction because in Somalia the peace-building process was primarily focusing on politically deriving and politically-led process. The conferences which were held in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Yemen, Sudan and Egypt can merely illustrate who are the political actors involved and invited to these conferences outside of Somalia. This occurred due to a recklessness of the international community in the context of Somalia because the Somali people wherever they are relied on their alternative leadership provided by traditional authorities, regardless the modern political institutions. In January 1991, the government fell in the face of an armed uprising in the capital Mogadishu,). One faction of the USC hurriedly formed an interim government and hastily selected

Ali Mahdi Mohamed as the interim president.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the USC split into two factions which precipitated the outbreak of the war between these two factions namely USC/SNA, and USC/SSA and this is referred back the prolong civil wars in the South and Central Somalia. USC, together with others, ousted President Siyad Barre in 1991 but then split into two rival factions headed by General Mohammed Farah Aidede faction and Ali Mahdi.<sup>53</sup> Primarily the USC/ SNA led by Aidede faction was supported by Habar Gedir –sub- clan Hawiye and USC/SSA led by Ali Mahdi was supported by Abgal sub- clan Hawiye. In comparison, the SNM had two wings—civilian and military. But, the Guurti or the House of Elders had leadership capacity to forge and facilitate the dialogue between these wings and the Guurti stands for both a political structure and traditional elders. But the USC did not engage the part of the traditional governance in these political grounds because the interviews conducted during the research demonstrated that from the beginning the USC had initial frictions and undefined political agenda. Moreover, the Hawiye which was the dominant clan of USC had deficiencies of customary and indigenous mechanism of the conflict resolution because the Italian colony is said to have obliterated these cultural and traditional leadership for survival of the colony.

However, the British administration in Somaliland used what is called indirect rule meaning the traditional elders especially Aqilis were facilitating between communities and the British administration and this has empowered the traditional leadership in Somaliland. Ultimately, the actors in Somalia's peace-building process who were engaged in the talks and conflict resolutions had some paradoxical and conflicting outlooks. This, in the end, had derailed Somalia's peacemaking, peace-building as well as peacekeeping interventions. The international community was fully dedicated to restore law and order through the top down. Peacekeeping troops were deployed on many occasions in the post-conflict era of Somalia. There is no doubt that the increasing number of peace operations has strained the ability of the United Nations to manage them effectively. Because it deals more with diplomacy than with control of military operations.<sup>54</sup> After all of the U.S. troops were withdrawn in March 1994, 20,000 U.N. troops were still in Somalia. By the late Spring of 1994 all of the remaining U.N. troops were withdrawn, ending UNOSOM-II.<sup>55</sup> This model of restoring peace and stability through peacekeeping faced a lot of obstacles and allegation and all actors in Somalia are busy with the fight against terrorism other than peace-building and absence of the traditional elders engagement in Somalia peace process constrained the anticipated outcome of the international community about Somalia peace-building and conflict transformation. To conclude, Somaliland's peace-building initiative finally produced a type of state which is democratic and inclusive, from national charter (1993) to constitutional democracy (2001) from clans' elected political representatives (1993) into democratic popular elected representatives (2002).

<sup>48</sup> Academy for Peace and Development (ADP) and International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace), the Search for Peace, Somali Program, Peace in Somaliland An indigenous Approach to State- building, Burao, Borame and Sanaag conference, 2008

<sup>49</sup> Dominik Balthasar, 2012, STATE-MAKING IN SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND Understanding War, Nationalism and State Trajectories as Processes of Institutional and Socio-Cognitive Standardization, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science

<sup>50</sup> Gérard Prunier, Somalia: Civil War, Intervention and Withdrawal 1995, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6c98.html>

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Mr. Nour Shire Osman Puntland Civil Society Chairman, 2017

<sup>52</sup> International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) and Centre for Search and Dialogue (CRD) the Search for Peace, A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, 2008

<sup>53</sup> Dr. KINFÉ ABRAHAM, SOMALIA CALLING – Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace, 2000, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development

<sup>54</sup> KENNETH ALLARD, SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED, 1994, [http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard\\_Somalia.pdf](http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> C.T. Evens and R. Snyder, operation Restore Hope/Battle of Mogadishu, 2001 <http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Somalia93/Somalia93.html>

Definitely, Somaliland's experience deserves to be duplicated and taken as a classical example of peacemaking and peace-building across the continent in Africa.

### **Somalia External Interventions: Advantages and Disadvantages**

The Somali Republic failed to establish a nation-state. This ultimately resulted in the scrambling of the regime led by General Mohamed Siyad Barre. Unfortunately, the Somali Republic attracted more foreign interventions alongside its post-colonial history of the declaration of the Somali Republic on July 1, in 1960. The Cold war rivalries of West and East immediately affected the formation and the statehood of the Somali Republic that the competitors of the Cold War see the Somali Republic more strategic location close to the Gulf of Aden, red sea and Indian Ocean. This war also brought into play Cold War rivalries, albeit in a singularly baroque way. Until 1974, the United States had supported Ethiopia, whereas the Soviet Union has found valuable ally, in Siyad Barre's military regime.<sup>56</sup> The superpowers' proxy wars achieved their maximum destructiveness in the Horn and southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>57</sup> The Somali Republic was subject to this bipolar political battle ground in the Horn of Africa whereas the Siyad Barre regime entertained both East and West respectively. From this strategic influence, the Siyad Barre regime had made a series of steps which were uncalculated political move and later on caused the demise of the Somali Republic and the regime had become strong ally with the Soviet Union gaining more military facilities and advanced military trainings. Therefore, the militarization of the Cold War rivalries boosted the economic and military capabilities of Siyad Barre's regime which triggered the war between Ethiopia and the Somali Republic in 1977. The Cold War had also completely overlooked the international peace and human rights, the Siyad Barre regime killed thousands of people but the international community reaction was neither visible nor intimidated the regime to halt the cruel action against the civilians. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and Soviet Union vied for influence and control over Somalia because of its strategic location along oil routes from the Persian Gulf.<sup>58</sup> In the meantime, the end of the Cold War totally ceased the bargaining superpower politics of West and East over the strategic alliances like the Somali Republic and it was unlikely this period to influence the international powers sympathy and their decisive action over the humanitarian assistance. Hence, the external interventions of the Cold War in Somalia had a background of incompatibility and tendencies of the international community to lose the sigh of humanity and credibility. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Somali Republic encountered severe humanitarian conditions attached with subsequent civil wars and fighting between factions of the Somali warlords. This was a noticeable time when the international community commenced humanitarian assistance to Somalia, but the fighting between USC factions refocused the distribution of the humanitarian assistance in Mogadishu. In addition, it is apparently testified that international interventions in the post-Siyad Barre regime were more uncoordinated and further narrowed the scope of the problems

of Somalia. In this respect, successive external interventions observed over the past three decades that Somalia has been in the delicate period and some of the behaviors observed during these interventions were in the shortcomings of the contextualization which led to the deterioration of the situation in Somalia.

Indeed, all these repeated international community interventions were doing some justifiable operations of humanitarian and security: but they also lacked the support and confidence from the general public that experienced daily shelling of civilians and the worsening situation of Somalia's security. Somalia has been 'securitized by the US under the heading of the global war on terror, that is, it has been discursively constructed as a threat of 'existential' proportions and considerable urgency, thus warranting a resort' extraordinary 'measure.'<sup>59</sup> Somalia was a subject of the external interventions and this has also inherited Somalia to be a place that the general public holds individually a lot of arms. Somalia is a country in which the international community is seeking to make and build peace in the context of ongoing war and active counter-insurgency operations.<sup>60</sup> Somalia is universally pictured as a country synonymous with terrorism, clannish, conflict, civil war, violence, warlords, famine, jihad, piracy and underdevelopment. The country has been engulfed in violent conflict for more than two decades.<sup>61</sup> Despite the lawlessness condition in Somalia, terrorism is another phenomenon that regionally and internationally attracted to fight against them. Although, there is a United Nations weapons embargo on Somalia, significant volumes of weapons are illegally smuggled into Somalia as many people live south and Central Somalia indicated during research for this paper. Those interviewed raised concerns that every deployment of the foreign troops in Somalia left more weapons that scattered through everywhere of the country. The UN's Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, whose mandate includes reporting on any violations of the arms embargo imposed on Somalia in 1992, said in the report that agents of the Al Qaeda-linked militants of Al Shabaab are known to frequent those black markets "to purchase weapons and ammunition."<sup>62</sup> The UN monitoring group Somalia and Eritrea coordinates this close oversight the arms illegal transfers under the Security Council. **Advantages:** The never-ending international community response to the Somalia crisis intended to create a safe corridor for humanitarian assistance and the restoration of peace and security. This period was also characterized by suffering, famine and destruction in many parts of Somalia. Hence, the international community's rapid reaction was rational and timely. Unfortunately, the USC factions who were fighting in Mogadishu disrupted this food aid delivery and overall humanitarian assistance in early times of 1991. In fact, the period 1990-1992 was historic because there were many international political events that ending up as the Cold War

<sup>59</sup> Bjorn Moller, *The Somali Conflict – the Role of External Actors*, 2009, Diis- Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

<sup>60</sup> United Nations, Results of the Secretary-General's technical assessment mission to Somalia, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2093 (2013), security council, 2013.

<sup>61</sup> Calleb Otieno Ongoma, Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Frank Khachina Matanga, *Role Of External Actor Involvement In Somalia Peace Building Processes*, 2016, International Journal of Recent Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (IJRRSSH) Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp: (166-186), Month: April 2016 - June 2016, Available at: [www.paperpublications.org](http://www.paperpublications.org)

<sup>62</sup> Malkhadir M. Muhumed, *UNSC Considers arms ban on Somalia for weapons diversion*, 2014, the East Africa <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Somalia-on-UN-watchlist-over-sale-of-weapons-to-terrorists-/2558-2227018-w4vmltz/index.html>

<sup>56</sup> Moller, *The Somali Conflict – the Role of External Actors*, 2009, Diis- Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen

<sup>57</sup> ROBERT J. MCMAHON, *The Cold War in the Third World*, Oxford University Press 2013

<sup>58</sup> Emira Woods, *peace for many in the U.S., Somalia is viewed as a powerful symbol of United Nations peacekeeping failure. 1997*, <http://fpif.org/somalia/>

which dramatically mounted the collapse of many dictatorships in Africa that the Cold War held to stay the power for too long and the breakdown of the Soviet Union was also an astonishing move forwarded ironically in the demise of the bipolar international politics in which Siyad Barre regime benefited much in the course of the Cold War era and this unconstructive political and military engagement brought by the Cold War left Somalia more devastated and failed state.

In other words, it was apparent that, bipolar world was very aggressive political arena that raised in African strategically included the Somali Republic but there is also a great deficiency in terms of creating democratic and politically sustainable nation state while African continent had been dominated by totalitarian single party regimes driving by few elites with colonial associates. Thus the Cold War played a key role in the disappointments of the postcolonial era, raising expectations as well as dashing them. But if Africa can claim a disproportionate share of that conflict's victims, so too did it boast many of its most ardent combatants.<sup>63</sup> The international response to the Somalia's crisis can be partly described as a collision of realities.<sup>64</sup> Thus, Somalia has become a battle ground of many warlords and factions but the successive international interventions at same time appeared more acceptable and many people proved to be optimistic regarding the assistance provided refugees camps as Dadaab which is one of the largest refugee camps on the world.

**Disadvantages:** Many ordinary people live in Somalia arguing why endless external interventions should be continued over and over again. Some people included scholars, politicians and civil society members interviewed during the research asserted that Somalia lost its integrity and sovereignty because of troops deployed too many regions of Somalia. Abdirisq Jama a business man believes that foreign troops and Al-shababa movement work together in a sense that each party's interests are relied on the chaotic situation of Somalia. Failure at earlier peace-making efforts can also result in the promotion of mutually exclusive basic requirements and preconditions for further negotiations.<sup>65</sup> As noted above, misconduct has assumed various forms, including the killing of civilians, sexual exploitation and abuse and engaging in illicit commerce (including allegations of the diversion of food, fuel supplies and armaments as well as participation in the illicit trades in charcoal and sugar).<sup>66</sup> Abdirisq notes that there is a lot of evidence indicating that the exploitation of the external interventions on Somali soil, actually, there are many people similar to Abdirisq in Somalia who are contending the notion of the foreign troops in Somalia may not be the agenda of the fighting only terrorism but the international community has another concealing interests whereas undisclosed security sources revealed that around 30 countries officially and unofficially deployed troops in Somalia and this is beyond the AMISOM troops track record. Furthermore, Somalia had never benefited from foreign interventions since the beginning and we think that all foreign troops are pursuing their state interests and not the interest of the Somali people. "We cannot

afford more of this humiliation period of occupation and misuse of our natural resources and Somalia integrity needs to restore and respected look how civilians are killed in every day in Somalia by foreign troops."<sup>67</sup> Really, I came across that the temper of the people in Somalia is more symbolic, but the eyes of the international community did not cast much this deeper resentment and disappointment over the interventions of the foreign troops. Finally, the counter-argument is, if Somalis are not able to resolve their problems, resorting peace through foreign interventions will be an unavoidable option. The researcher's observation in this area is that international interventions encountered much difficult and it may never prevail in the long run to stabilize fully in Somalia. Have observed that a lot of misapprehensions towards the foreign troops and other international presence in Somalia and it is a testimony how the perception of the wider public should not helpful at all. For example, currently the African Union Troops (AMISOM) has become the most and long international intervention to Somalia since 2007 -2017. AMISOM was never intended to be a permanent fixture of the Somali landscape but the mission is now nearly nine years old. AMISOM will leave Somalia; the questions are how and when.<sup>68</sup>

### **Liberation Movements: Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC)**

Since the Somali Republic turned into dictatorship to the point where it was branded a state 'fighting' with its people, there were liberation movements as Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which before the Siyad Barre regime ceased but Somali National Movement (SNM) and United Somali Congress (USC) were finally ousted the regime on January 1991. Actually, the armed struggle against the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre was overwhelmingly prevailed the minds and hearts of the citizens oppressed and the rebel movements utilized continued support provided by large Somali citizens in and outside of the Somali Republic.

In this respect, the formation and the political structures of the rebel movements contributed to the interventions to restore peace and stability both in Somaliland and Somalia. This demonstrated that SNM leadership was more democratic and elected its chairmanship more than five times and the organization was influenced by civilians. In contrast, the USC was seen as more of a militarized political organization that fueled the hostility and mistrust between Hawiye and Darood as some interviewees persons argued. Many Somali people have revealed that the USC has escalated the violent conflict in Somalia as bloody civil wars that erupted aftermath of Siyad Barre. However, the USC to be divided into two factions where one faction was led by the USC chairman General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the other by Ali Mahid Mohamed, as respondents pointed out that the division and internal conflict between USC itself worsened the situation of Somalia and the capital city of Mogadishu which these factions fought extensively. Therefore, the peace-building process influenced by the political agenda of the rebellion movements of SNM and USC. This is the outset of divergent approaches which the SNM concentrated the reconciliation of SNM supporters and non-SNM supports, but the USC failed to undertake such conflict resolutions interventions and peace-building initiatives. Some interviewed persons commented that the USC was not prepared to handle such multifaceted problems in Somalia, on the other hand, the legacy of the Siyad Barre

<sup>63</sup> ROBERT J. MCMAHON, *The Cold War in the Third World*, Oxford University Press 2013

<sup>64</sup> John G. Sommer, Director Somalia Humanitarian Aid Study, *Hope Restored Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994*, RPG, Refugees Policy Group, Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugees issues, 1994, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNABZ357.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABZ357.pdf)

<sup>65</sup> LM MAKHUBELA, *Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning from Failed Mediation Processes*, University of Pretoria, 2010

<sup>66</sup> Paul D. Williams with Abdirashid Hashi, *Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia*, 2016, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Dahir Mohamed Adam human rights activists based in Somalia, 2017

<sup>68</sup> Paul D. Williams with Avbdirashid Hashi, *Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia*, 2016, the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies,

regime which was deeper and created prior hostile environment throughout Somali Republic from tyranny to atrocities.

The USC became a newly established rebel movement dominated by the Hawiye clan and the people interviewed during the research pointed to the distinction that the USC was led by a military expert, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, but SNM was led by civilian politician Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (Tuur) who was elected before one year the fall down of the regime. The United Somali Congress (USC) was established in 1987 whereas the Somali National Movement (SNM) was established in 1981. The political maturity of the two rebellion movements was also noticeable and reflected in the peace process on the ground during the aftermath of the Siyad Barre regime. In addition, the peace-building actors in Somaliland and Somalia had proved the disparity of ideological, cultural and political perceptions. Somaliland was determined to be more self-reliant and locally mobilized grass-roots and Somaliland traditional elders made extraordinary efforts to control the situation in collaboration with politicians and armed militants. The researcher also had an interview with Diini Mohamed Diini, Somalia civil society chairman. He believes that Somalia's traditional elders were not given a chance to talk about the peace and social reconciliations but "international community held conferences in Djibouti, Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Cairo that only politicians and warlords attended. But Somaliland obtained an opportunity that local communities were empowered and given confidence to resolve their problems and culturally there are some differences in the two sides."<sup>69</sup> Indeed, the argument that Diini raised is valid in the sense that Somalia's traditional elders were not brought on broad to participate the peace-building process. But, it is also necessary to understand that Somaliland traditional elders who were leading the peace process did not get an idle time of politicians but the traditional elders were pushing the agenda for peace and clans reconciliations. It is undeniable that Somaliland traditional elders are more active even than the politicians when it comes to peacemaking, conflict resolution and building mutual relationships among the society. This is what enabled the peace and stability in Somaliland to be sustained at the grass-roots level. In Somalia, however, the attention was focused on international mediations and making peace through more forcible approach without reviewing the considerable reflections in the local communities. Nonetheless, the multiple roles played the rebel movement of SNM in the political and social reconciliations resulted Somaliland to become an oasis of peace, democratic and recovering nation that relied on its local resources mobilization. In this peace process, all the clan militias demobilized and reintegrated successfully and it was also historical legacy when the SNM handed over the power to the civilian leadership in 1993. This step of the leadership handover widely accelerated the conflict transformation efforts and rebuilding state and political institutions in Somaliland. Eventually, the SNM to relinquish its power was inspired by the new political atmosphere of reconstruction, rehabilitation, reconciliation and recognition among people in Somaliland. The SNM, as political organ, gave birth to the democracy experimentation in Somaliland and is still guiding it in more ways than one. It has learned how to forgive, how to compromise and how to relinquish state power when this was

dictated by the principles for which it was struggling even at the temporary cost of its own internal unity.<sup>70</sup>

Today, Somaliland is an example to all African countries and post-conflict state formation nations and some SNM veterans interviewed widely emphasized how the SNM took a lion's share in the cessation of the clans' antagonism and encouraged more compromise, forgiveness and genuine reconciliations. On the other hand, the USC has failed to control revenge among clans in the South Somalia which led the behavior of anarchy and tragedy situation in Somalia. Thus, this new cycle of violent conflict portrayed the level of humanitarian disaster in Mogadishu unlikely other cities of Somalia and this has immediately caused the continued international interventions which still struggling to bring back Somalia on track. But the legacy of the USC administration signified a gloomy history that many Somalis pointing whatever happened in Somalia rooted the dictatorship of Siyad Barre who divided Somali clans into many factions and the USC which has repeated same mistakes of the political and social polarizations. On the other hand, the internationally sponsored peace-building conferences had never been contemplated meaningfully. The Somali clans' reconciliation and mitigating the tremendous violent conflicts, arguably the failure of the USC leadership combined with the consequences of the international interventions made an impact which is negative and uncertain. It is obvious that the violent conflict of Somalia intensified the deleterious conditions during the warlords era (1992-2006) following the Al-shabaaba period and it is explicitly found that there are a lot of asymmetric factors that ends up the myriad uncalculated political spectrum and lost of the social political identity was a central. Somalia took a federalism political system which the international community predicted to reduce the level of violent conflict in Somalia. But many people particularly normal citizens reacted that what is called the federalism system is neither applicable to the context nor has the legitimacy of the constitutional development since Somalia draft constitution has not been approved. The international community and other regional actors are often misinformed or ignorant about Somali political and social dynamics, which renders their mediation or assistance efforts inexpert and even detrimental to the situation.<sup>71</sup> Some people live in Somalia challenging the objective of the external involvement in Somalia affairs and they critically pointed out that Somalia has become a home of securitization, militarization and smuggling of the weaponry market and insurgencies fortified place. It can be argued that militarizing concept will never bring an ultimate and plausible solution in Somalia. And getting sustainable peace and reliable security in Somalia will require much more coordinated efforts of the grass-roots participation and examining genuinely the political and social context of Somalia. The consecutive external interventions and inability of domestic leadership intensified the diverse problems in Somalia over the past three decades and the breakdown of the USC leadership and prior their weak institutional capacity combined with other difficult circumstances of infighting and famine reflected more negative image of Somalia which still remains in Somalia to in danger zone in the Horn of Africa.

### **Somaliland House of Guurti Peacemaking and Peace - Building process**

<sup>70</sup> Ibrahim Megag Samater, Light at end of the Tunnel: Some Reflections on the Struggle of the National Movement, 1993

<sup>71</sup> Centre for Research and Dialogue based on Mogadishu, Somalia: Path to Recovery Building a Sustainable Peace, 2004

<sup>69</sup> Interview with Diini Mohamed Diini chairman of South and Central Somalia civil society, 2017

Somaliland's House of Guurti which mainly consists of key prominent persons of traditional elders and intellectuals was formed earlier during the struggle of the Somali National Movement (SNM). "The Guurti was established to coordinate and mobilize both the human resources and logistics as food because Guurti was representing the Isaq clans who have been supporting the SNM".<sup>72</sup> Jama Hassan Duale who is one of the intellectuals in Somaliland believes that forming the House of Guurti was a remarkable move that SNM made and he is arguing that the success of liberation that SNM achieved was behind the Guurti. In 1988, Somaliland elders established the council of Elders (Guurti) separate from the SNM's political and military wings, to address the social and humanitarian aspects of the crisis in the area which was targeted for special offensive by the Siyad Barre government.<sup>73</sup> In Somaliland, there are four main clans which inhabit this territory: the Isaq inhabits the center and is the main clan and the Isaq dominated the whole project of the SNM struggle started in 1981-1991; the other main clans include Gadabuursi and Esse which inhabit the western regions of Somaliland; and Dhulbahante and Warsangeli, Daron who are sub-clans of Harti occupy the eastern regions of Somaliland. However, there are other clans such as the Gabooye who are recognized as minority clan. The House of Guurti therefore is more inclusive body of the parliament at present time. Moreover, in the Somali context, the Guurti is defined a person or persons who are respected among the society for their integrity, neutrality, honesty, creativity, wisdom, experience and knowledge about the context, MP Sahal Iid Dirir one of the members of Somaliland House of Guurti stated "that being a Guurti requires a set of criteria to be fulfilled included attesting consistent and popular credibility, domestic knowledge and capacity to undertake serious negotiations."<sup>74</sup> Therefore, the Somali culture itself promotes such attributes which the customary relied on and reinforce their judgment and resolutions. The term Guurti is applied to a group of elders selected to resolve a specific problem within a clan or between clans. When a problem arises among the clans or sub-clans, elders come together to discuss possible resolutions, and in so doing form a *guurti*.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, in Somaliland the term of the Guurti currently is explained as the House of Elders (Guurti). Hence, today the House of Elders (Guurti) has become instrumental to any political and social conflict resolution effort in Somaliland. During the SNM era, the Guurti played a considerable role in the political and military sustainability of the SNM because the Guurti arbitrated many internal conflicts within the SNM and provided more support because the Guurti was trusted by local communities and even the Diaspora. As a result, the SNM was more self-reliant politically and militarily as an organization since the whole of project of the struggle against the Siyad Barre regime was financed by Somaliland communities. In the aftermath of the liberation, the SNM encountered more political challenges and new conflicts whilst SNM itself were two wings – one has more socialists that mostly trained in the Soviet Union and the others have more politicians educated in western countries. In other words, one group was more military dominated while the

other group was more civilian politicians. In this regard, the Guurti was moderating the relationship of these various groups that had ideological difference. The House of Guurti had also mediated between factions of SNM who were two wings civilian wing and military wing and these two wings confronted aftermath of the Siyad Barre regime collapsed where SNM seized the majority cities of Somaliland in 1991.<sup>76</sup> Despite the internal political stabilization, the Guurti stood to save the lives of thousands of people within Somaliland commenced the negotiations and reconciliations clans supported SNM and clans did not support SNM but lived in Somaliland. The Guurti was a major player or corridor of political spirit behind the whole peacemaking initiatives that diminished tensions and attempted to curb violent conflicts between SNM supporters and non-SNM supporters and later between SNM supporters themselves. The House of Guurti's peacemaking initiatives prevented any external interventions to take place in Somaliland soil compared to what happened in Somalia. In fact, there were several reasons which contributed to the Guurti's successful peacemaking and peace-building interventions. First, the lengthy experience which the Guurti gained during the ten years of the SNM struggle in which the Guurti played a dual role of political and social mobilizations. Second, the clans who lived in Somaliland have been fighting for more than a decade during the Siyad Barre regime and seemed to be exhausted and needed a peaceful settlement. Third, the absence of international interventions as Mogadishu experienced really cannot be underestimated. In this peace-building process led by the Guurti tackled to reduce any attempted violent conflict either between politicians or clans in Somaliland; subsequently, the state-building was one element among the broader peace-building attempts and to resolve the clans' conflicts prior to state formation that laid down the foundation of Somaliland's state and political structures. Today, Somaliland boasts a degree of stability that exceeds that of the other Somali territories and has taken many credible steps towards the establishment of a genuinely pluralistic democracy.<sup>77</sup> The Guurti has led all the conferences held across the regions in Somaliland especially the major one that was held in Borame in 1993 which had significant impact on Somaliland's overall political future, peace and stability. This was because this conference consolidated both the long term efforts of the peacemaking and peace-building proceedings and electing the new leadership of the next three years as president, vice president and bicameral parliament. In the meantime, it is notable to mention that mediations facilitated and sponsored by the House of Guurti had become more champion, inclusive and context-oriented and there are a lot of lessons which deserve to be highlighted and shared more widely. Many outsiders including academics, UN and international institutions praised a great deal the House of Guurti's model of peacemaking, peace-building, and their reliance on and experiences in indigenous conflict resolution methods. What were also interesting during this initial period of time were the clans and political dynamics because the clans who were not mostly the SNM supporters as Gadabuursi, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli had become more active in the mediations and peacemaking agenda across Somaliland regions. Somaliland's model of peace-building and state-

<sup>72</sup> Interview with Ali Mohamed Ali one of the SNM veteran, 2017

<sup>73</sup> Dr. KINFE ABRAHAM, SOMALIA CALLING – Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace, 2000, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development

<sup>74</sup> Interview with MP Sahal Iid Dirir member of Somaliland House of Guurti, 2017

<sup>75</sup> Academy for Peace and Development (ADP) and International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace), the Search for Peace, Somali Program, Peace in Somaliland An indigenous Approach to State-building, Burao, Borame and Sanaag conference, 2008

<sup>76</sup> Mohamed A. Mohamoud (Barawani), Understanding Somaliland's State-Building process: Hybrid Political Order and Contemporary Challenges, 2017

<sup>77</sup> Academy for Peace and Development (ADP) and International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace), the Search for Peace, Somali Program, Peace in Somaliland An indigenous Approach to State-building, Burao, Borame and Sanaag conference, 2008

building process conceptually and practically cultivated the consensus building scenarios that promote such paradigm of traditional and indigenous profoundly rooted conceptions. Without the intercession of the international diplomacy sponsoring liberal peace initiatives, the Republic of Somaliland proved its capability of delivering on primary, core state functions, such as the distribution of public goods and security.<sup>78</sup>The scenarios that the Guurti pursued to undertake during the peace process seemed to be more accommodative to the various interests and ambitions of all conflicting parties to give a confidence and encourage the demystifications the issues that parts are in dispute. However, Somalia so far lacks such indigenous arrangement of peace-building and conflict transformation in its ongoing efforts to restore peace. After 27 years, Somalia peace-building proceedings have not succeeded to engage the grass-roots opinion-makers including the traditional and religious leaders because there is a need to conduct true political and social reconciliation in Somalia. Furthermore, there are many challenges that at present time the Somaliland House of Guurti apparently encounters because the previous successful history of the Guurti is overshadowed by two factors. First, the House of Guurti was not elected for more than 25 years and many people raising the concerns that the Guurti needs more modification and review in their mandate. Secondly, the Guurti often has the mandate to extend the term of the elected bodies if an election has not been conducted according to electoral schedule. Therefore, the Guurti to renew the expired term of the elected bodies such as the president, vice president, House Representatives and local government and this is resulted in more repercussions and lowered the public confidence about the Guurti's future existence.

## Conclusion

The analysis which this paper provides not only demonstrates the divergent modalities of the peace process in Somaliland and Somalia, but also reveals how locally-cultivated, locally-driven and locally-accepted social and political agreements are more meaningful and worthwhile compared to the internationally-mediated and internationally planned peace processes and interventions. —Moreover, Somaliland and Somalia's peace-building processes have made a progress in sense of the chaotic situation inherited from the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. In the meantime; these continued challenges obstructed the efforts to regain peace and stability. Every society on the world has traits and respected socio-cultural values that should be difficult to dismiss. But it is substantial to understand more and more what triggers the tensions, and conflicts between Somali clans which are same culture and religion. If the root causes of the problem are ignored, it will never deliver a viable outcome. History instructs how humans settle and fix their problems through the ways and means that used so many centuries and how society recognizes the life prefect and working. However, among the lessons that can be learnt in this comparative analysis, one of them that stand out clearly is allowing a society to rethink and resolve its own problems. This is more sustainable than peacekeeping troops' deployment and costly international mediations. Hence, it can

be argued that Somalia's peace process was hijacked by the international community: the United Nations and the African Union are the principle actors of Somalia, the past failures of Somalia's external interventions may affect the overall future development and if international community at present time exhausted and not progressing except the fight against the Al-Shabab which the AMISOM has managed to push out into specific areas in the South and Central Somalia included the capital city of Mogadishu. Somaliland which is the de facto state looks like more competent to manage its internal frictions with a model of peace and state formation which restores the hope of African communities to inspire such self-reliance mood of optimism, overconfidence and trust without international mediation. But, Somalia must learn from Somaliland how to make peace and political stability by engaging in the domestic actors and not to give up whatever constraints intimidate and undermine the solidarity of the people and their aspirations. To this end, the core problems of Somalia fall under rising geopolitical interests and geographical aspects. There are deep levels of insecurity that should compel the international interventions to be timely and justifiable. The dramatic shift of the international politics from bipolar to multipolar politics, international persistent violent conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia and many other events created the international security dilemma at the global political system.

Somalia is always in the spotlight in international news media: terrorism, explosions, lawlessness, humanitarian crisis and organized assassinations. The new president of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Faramajo declared during his inauguration speech in February 2017 that more than 3000 people were killed in the year of 2016. And even till now that new president of Mohamed Abdullahi Faramjo was elected in February this year the Al-Shabaaba threat was not succeeded to mitigate due to daily killings and shelling. But in this new government, there is hope that restoring security will be the central pillar of the statehood in Somalia. There are other hardships in the region: recurrent droughts; extreme poverty and insecurity and these have devastated the lives and livelihoods of communities across the region in the Horn of Africa. The Republic of Somaliland is a victim for its cause of independence. But it is really encouraging sign that the people of Somaliland are very resilient and deserve to be recognized.

There is no doubt that Somaliland's peace-building and state-building succeeded and contributed to the peace, stability, security and regional economic integration across the greater Horn of Africa. And, if the Horn of Africa is keen to be more stable and secure, reaching a two state solution of Somaliland and Somalia is inevitable and it is the responsibility of the African Union to undertake a holistic and coordinated fact-finding mission on the case of Somaliland and Somalia. Somalia's case of restoring peace and stability will take a long time unless the local people feel that peace needs a collective responsibility. They equally have to learn to devote their energy, resources and experiences towards peace-building initiatives. The political system that Somalia at present pursues is not consistent. It can trigger new political conflict which is likely to cause another civil war in Somalia, since the notion of federalism is not clearly defined. Competing clans arguing over the demarcation of federal states territory may locally distort the fragile peace and stability of Somalia. Somaliland's pathway to peacemaking is an example worth emulating.

<sup>78</sup>Debra Valentina Malito, The liberal myth of neutrality and the Local Peace Process in Somaliland, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Paper Prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Warsaw Workshop Number 3: Pragmatic Approaches to Peacebuilding, 2015, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/f89cb357-08cb-4737-bf48-7994e26d849e.pdf>