



CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE - ISSUES AND CONCERNS OVER THE CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

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ABSTRACT

Recent attacks in the Uri Sector allegedly by Pakistani militants, has raised Chinese concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Increasing efforts by Pakistan to internationalize the Kashmir issue has caused considerable anxiety and concerns within the Chinese administration. The CPEC which connects the Pakistani port in Gwadar with Kashgar in Xinjiang, China, has tremendous potential to supply China with energy and is set to become an important economic corridor which would connect China with the Central Asian region. The port of Gwadar which is not far from the Strait of Hormutz near the Persian Gulf allows the Chinese to monitor its sea lines of communication through which 60 percent of its crude supply from west Asia is transported to China. This also helps in the reduced dependence of China on the Straits of Malacca. While there is much gain through the completion of CPEC, there remains a host of issues which pose significant challenges towards this \$46 billion project. In this paper, I examine the emergence of the bilateral agreement and the issues and challenges which are significant in this regard. More importantly in terms of the challenges, this paper would look into the Kashmir issue which seems to be posing real obstacle with regard to the future of the CPEC. Thus, the paper would examine (i) the importance of CPEC, (ii) impact of the CPEC in the context of Pakistan's engagement in Kashmir and (iii) challenges which are of concern in terms of the completion and (iv) future of the CPEC in the context of existing militancy in the region (Baluchistan, Kashmir and also in the Xinjiang province).

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INTRODUCTION

The study of regions and regional orders for a long time, occupied a small and insignificant place in international relations theory. However, in recent times, there are books which argue that regions are central to the understanding of world politics (Acharya 2007: 629). In today's trend of international studies, the resurrection and redefinition of the concept of regionalism has become dominant. After some decades of neglect, the concept of regionalism has seen a revival both in academic and policy debates. While globalization has been the buzzword among international relations scholars in describing the emerging world order, regionalism constitutes a set of mid-level alternatives in policy, practice and analysis (Soderbaum 2003:1; Buzan and Weaver 2003: 10). Over the past two decades, one of the most important developments in the discourse on world economy has been the rapid growth in the number of international economic integration agreements.

Economic Integration Agreements (EIA), often appear in the form of treaties between economic units and in terms of international EIAs, they are between nations which is aimed at reducing policy-controlled barriers to the flow of goods, services, capital, labor, etc. EIAs in most cases tend to be regional in scope and many are Free Trade Agreements (FTA). By the year 2006, the World Trade Organization (WTO), notified that there were about 300 regional trade agreements were either planned, concluded negotiations or were in force. Over 250 such agreements which were notified to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the WTO between 1947 and 2002, more than half of these agreements were notified after the year 1995 thus showcasing a virtual explosion in the number of EIAs over the past two decades – 'New Regionalisms' (Baier, Bergstrand, and Egger 2006). In the context of new regionalisms, some of its characteristics are important but apply at varying degrees in different regional agreements: (i) new regionalism generally involves the linking of one or more small countries with a large nation, (ii) it is

common that small countries have recently made or are making significant and important unilateral reforms, (iii) new regionalisms only allow modest liberalization, (iv) small countries achieve liberalization and agreements are one sided, (v) regional agreements often involves deep integration where partnering countries rarely limit themselves to reducing or removing trade barriers but also complement and alter many economic policies which might be of interest to them, (vi) regional agreements are often typically regional geographically and those countries which partner with each other are neighbors (Ethier 1998:1150-52).

Regionalism in the Asian Context

Asia has become one of the momentous regions which has been affected most through regional integration initiatives. Never has transport, communication, trade (both legal and illegal), been flourishing as it is now. There has been a significant increase in terms of cross border trade, roads connecting mega cities, new suburbs and integrated production networks extend towards far-flung manufacturing hubs. Nowhere has this level of regional integration been noticed where integration is spontaneous and tangible (Frost 2008: 1). What does all these buzz direct towards – genuine political integration or just rhetoric? Asian regionalism is real and irreversible although integration will remain loose and informal for a long time, the political resolve to form a meaningful community of some sort seems to be emerging. It is also noteworthy that Asian integration contributes to peace, prosperity and development. The integration initiatives in Asia seem to be signaling the rise of China as a major power to reckon with in the region (ibid: 3).

China as an Emerging Power in the South Asian Region

The rise of China and India is an often evoked term of reference in recent years since the nineties (Xiaoquiang 2000: 391). Although, there may be debates over how far they have risen and also in terms of great power status, their geopolitical horizons have widened and both these nations strive to stamp their authority over the region (Scott 2008: 1). Furthermore, changes that have occurred in the Asian context are often directed towards the role that China has played in the region. For quite sometime there has been a realization both in China and in India that there is tremendous potential which can be beneficial for these two nations if economic relations between them are furthered. The characterization of relations among nations in the Asian region has been significantly altered or affected due to the rise of China's capabilities in terms of its military and economy, political influence, diplomatic voice and its increasing involvement in the region's multilateral institutions (Shambaug 2006: 1). One of the key issues arising out of the rise of China and its implications in terms of international relations has been over whether this rise would progress peace or would be a disruptive force to the existing international order. The rise of China and its challenges has deep scholarly foundations where some of the fundamental concepts of international relations theories have been touched upon. Coupled with this is the fact that it has clear policy implications and tremendous influence over the US' foreign policy and more particularly in terms of its (US) policy towards China. While realism has a strong influence on examining the rise and fall of nations, classical realism and structural realism place their emphasis on balance of power (Zhao & Liu 2007: 586). In the words of Kenneth N. Waltz,

'China's steady but moderate efforts to enhance the quality of its armed forces is often seen by the Americans as a threat to their future and that of the others. Whatever the concerns and the feeling of threat that is felt by the United States, Japan has already felt them and has gradually reacted to them. China on the other hand is concerned over the airlift and sealift capabilities of Japan and the continued support provided by the United States towards the South Korean armed forces. Chinese, Japanese and South Korean actions and reaction in context, with or without the participation of the United States seems to be creating a new balance of power in East Asia, which is also becoming part of the new balance of power in the world' (Waltz 2000: 36). John Mearsheimer offers offensive realism in contrast to Waltz's defensive realism where he states that it is a sad, ruthless and dangerous business in international politics which is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of competition increases and decreases, great powers often fear each other and always compete for maintaining superiority which may be even at the expense of other states. If China emerges as an economic powerhouse (which it has achieved to a certain extent), it will look to translate its economic might into military might.

He further argues that neither China's neighbors nor the United States would idly watch over the rising increments of power, they would instead look to contain it by forming a balancing coalition which in turn might result in the fear of great power war looming large over them. In other words, China and the United States are destined to be adversaries given the fact that China is an ever growing power (Mearsheimer 2001: 4). Zbigniew Brzezinski, realist strategist, looks at the Chinese challenge in a completely different approach where he argues that conflict is not inevitable or even likely. However, his position in this context is that China would not want to challenge the United States militarily but rather emerge through economic development and receive acceptance as a great power. More importantly China is interested in sustaining its economic growth, attract maximum resources in terms of technology and strategic materials from the international system and reduce threats from external sources which would result in the depletion of its resources (Brzezinski 2005; Zhao & Liu 2009: 3-5; Lampton 2007: 117-18). The sudden emergence of China as a major player has created shockwaves in the international market for oil and other raw materials. The fact that China has become the world's second largest oil consumer and third biggest importer should not be a surprise. However, the speed and magnitude of this transition has seemingly shattered the fragile balance of the global oil market. This shift in terms of exports to imports of oil by China has come over in just a period of ten years which also amounts to 35 percent of the growth in the global demand for oil between 2001 and 2004 (Muller 2006: 9).

This sudden rise as a consumer in the global oil market itself is posing serious challenges to China. While it cannot be attributed to China's inability to pay, but it is because of the relative stability and division of the global oil market already made through investments in the oilfield development and transportation. Exports from the American hemisphere (Canada, Mexico and Venezuela) which go to the United States amount to about 76 percent, while Europe receives 83 percent of exports from Russia (Russia, Caspian Basin) as also the that which is produced in north Africa and two thirds of production which goes to south Asia. Many of these challenges which are faced by China are long transportation routes,

existing transportation infrastructure, the market coordinates of the companies which are involved in exploitation and traditional business relationships. One option which the Chinese have in this context is overpaying than what is the market price, overbidding for companies and exploration and political maneuvering (ibid: 12). With the ever increasing integration of China with the global economy, future energy demands will have a global impact not only economically but also in terms of political and geopolitical aspects (Sandklef 2004: 7). The dramatic rise of China and its increased weight and influence in world affairs has generated a deep sense of insecurity and vulnerability partly caused by the increasing reliance on imported energy and maritime commercial routes. Thus emerging powers such as China highlight the dilemma while dealing with insecurities in terms of sustaining their growth (Wang 2016: 1). However, while China faces these strategic challenges in the Indian Ocean Region, it looks to overcome it through overland initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC). While China faces these hurdles in terms of energy demands, it has initiated huge bilateral agreements of which the CPEC is one and the other is the BCIM in which it has considerable interest.

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

Expressing their determination to further elevate their all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, Pakistan and China have decided to deepen and broaden their strategic economic engagement to achieve common development and welfare of their peoples. The joint statement issued after the conclusion of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz's visit to China during 16-20 April 2007, implied that the traditional friendship between the two countries now included new objectives that would improve the economic content of the relationship which would comprise investment, trade and energy cooperation within the framework of a bilateral agreement whilst also ensuring that the relationship would bring prosperity and development to the countries in consonance with the overall regional framework and concerns of the WTO. By the year 2013, China was the second largest recipient of Pakistani exports which stood at 11 percent amounting to US\$3.2 billion. At the same time, China was the second largest exporter to Pakistan at 16 percent of the total imports by the country which was valued at US\$11.1 billion. The China-Pakistan relationship has been a defining feature in the geopolitics of south Asia since the 1960s. It also seemed a reasonable for China to countervail India by expanding its relations with other states in south Asia neighboring India and more particularly with Pakistan which has positioned itself as India's chief adversary both in terms of ideological and psychological reasons. (Kumar 2007: 757-58; Reeves 2016:112).

In the context of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, it seeks to integrate China with economies of Asia as well as that of Africa and middle east which would establish common interests between those countries who are engaged as China's trading and investment partners. Trade and financial integration often tends to reduce conflict between states, raises opportunity costs in terms of forgone trade and access to capital which is associated with conflict and creating vested domestic interests which prefer peace over war (Hendrix 2016). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative which would link Kashgar to the sea port of Gawdar

in Pakistan traverses through the territories which are dominated by ethnic minorities such as the Balochs in Pakistan and the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang province in China. The proposed corridor also passes through Jammu and Kashmir (POK) which is already a site of competing territorial claims (ibid). The CPEC which was visualized by Premier Li Keqiang during his visit to Pakistan in 2013, would cover over 1800 miles providing Pakistan with much needed economic infrastructure more particularly power generation plants. This economic corridor is located where the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road meet. Thus, it forms a major project of the Belt and Road initiative. The estimated costs incurred for the completion of the project is approximately US\$46 billion which is almost equivalent to 20 percent of Pakistan's annual GDP.

The economic corridor looks to add 17,000 megawatts of electricity generation to Pakistan costing \$34 billion and the remaining \$12 billion would be spent for transport infrastructure which includes development of the railway line between Karachi and Peshawar. The CPEC is expected to be completed by the year 2030 which would shorten transportation of energy to China from the middle east by about 12,000 Kilometers (Kms) as well as link China's underdeveloped far western region and Pakistan's Gwadar deep-sea port in the Arabian sea via Pakistan Occupied Kashmir through a massive and complex network of roads, railways, business zones, energy schemes and pipelines. It is estimated that US\$15.5 billion worth of coal, wind, solar and hydro energy projects will be functional by the year 2017 in which Pakistan will benefit 10,400 megawatts of energy to its national grid. Energy generation which form a major focus of the CPEC, looks to generate electricity for Pakistan which is facing a routine five hour power cut through the 'Early Harvest' scheme of the initiative. These energy projects are expected to be constructed by Chinese private independent power producers. The Exim Bank of China is expected to finance these private investments at the rate of 5-6 percent interest from which Pakistan will be obliged to buy electricity at pre-negotiated rates. Energy is expected to be produced through (i) renewable energy projects, (ii) Coal, and (iii) Liquefied Natural Gas. Renewable energy projects have been undertaken by Zonergy and Xinjiang Oasis. Zonergy which would complete the 6500 acre worlds largest solar plant in Quaid-e-Azam Park near Bahawalpur would generate 1000 megawatts and is expected to be completed by December 2016. The first phase of this project was started by Xinjiang Oasis which has begun producing 100 MW of electricity and the remaining 900 MW capacity will be installed by Zonergy under the CPEC.

Various other schemes such as the Jhimpir Wind Power Plant built by the Turkish company Zorlu Energy has begun selling 56.4 MW of electricity to Pakistan. A united initiative of China and Pakistan (United Energy Pakistan) under the CPEC through which 250 MW of electricity is to be produced is to be built at a cost of US\$ 659 million. Among other important renewable energy projects, the Dawood Wind Energy Project developed by Hydro China at a cost of US\$115 million is expected to produce 50 MW of power. The Suki Kinari Hydropower Project in the Khagan Valley of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province will produce 870 MW at a cost of US\$ 1.8 billion. 720 MW is expected to be produced through the construction of the Karot Dam which is part of the CPEC is estimated at a cost of US\$ 1.6 billion and is financed

separately by the China Silk Road Fund. China and Pakistan are also discussing the feasibility of a Diamer-Bhasha Dam which would produce 4500 MW at a cost of US\$ 14 billion which is to be part of the CPEC. However, there has been no consensus on this initiative. Another US\$2.4 billion project aimed at producing 1100 MW is being constructed by the Kohala Hydro Power Project which has now become part of the CPEC. Although there has been multiple initiatives for power generation through renewable energy projects, coal power projects form a major part in terms of energy generation under the CPEC. The Shanghai Electric Company will construct two 660MW power plants as part of the Thar-I Project in the Thar coalfield in Sindh Province. This facility is expected to be locally sourced coal and expected to be fully functional by 2018. Close to the Thar-I project the China Machinery Engineering Corporation in collaboration with Pakistan's Engro Corporation, two 330MW power plants along with the construction coalmine which can produce 3.8 million tonne extraction of coal per year has been proposed as the first phase of the Thar-II project.

This project is expected to be completed by the year 2019 in which over US\$1.9 billion would be invested. In subsequent phases and over a period of ten years, these projects are expected to yield 3960MW of electricity. In order to distribute the power generated through the Thar projects, the Matiari to Lahore transmission line costing US\$2.1 billion and Matiari to Faisalabad costing US\$1.5 billion is also to be constructed as part of the CPEC. Another joint venture in the Sindh province costing US\$2.8 billion with a capacity to produce 1320 MW of electricity near the Port Qasimis to be constructed by both the A-Mirqab Capital from Qatar and China's Power Construction Company. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is also an integral part of the CPEC. The Chinese government has proposed to build a 711 Km pipeline to transport LNG from Gwadar to Nawabshah. This pipeline is also designed to be part of the 2775 Km Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline which would connect the 80 Kms between Gwadar and the Iranian border. This is expected to be completed when sanctions on Iran are eased. It is also important to notice that Iran has completed over 900 Kms of pipeline construction within its territory. The pipeline connectivity on the Pakistani side is to be constructed by China-Petroleum Pipelines Bureau. The pipeline is expected to transport about 1 billion cubic feet of LNG everyday. This will not only allow Pakistan to have access to gas exporters but will also provide China a secure route to import its own requirements in terms of energy (Teizzi 2016). From a Chinese perspective, this project would enable China to have direct access to the Indian Ocean and beyond, which also would mark a major advance in the influence it has in central and south Asia. As the world's largest importer of oil, China's key concern is its energy security which it seeks to overcome through these overland initiatives which again connects the Gulf and China through pipeline carrying energy and also cuts thousands of kilometers of ocean transportation through southeast Asia (Battacharjee 2015).

Threats to the CPEC

Infrastructure and the attendant construction projects pose as very enticing targets for attacks by violent dissidents who look to make headlines, wreck havoc and or ensnare a more powerful foe in a costly counter insurgency campaign. In terms of the CPEC the risks associated with infrastructure are both direct and indirect where the Chinese will have to bear most of

the burden. Internal threats to the CPEC exist in the vast Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang which forms the core area of the Silk Road Economic Belt, connects China to countries such as Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan, through the overland component of the Belt and Road Initiative. Xinjiang which is home to approximately 15 million people belonging to the Uyghur ethnic group a Turkic people with Islam as their religion, have been contesting the Chinese rule since, at least, 1960s. Uyghur separatists more particularly the East Turkestan Islamic Movement have been linked to the Al-Qaeda and other international Jihadist groups. Although China is not a hotbed of insurgent movements or terrorist activity, unrest in Xinjiang province may rise to levels which might be unexpected. The Uyghur insurgents have conducted attacks in Urumqi and the nearby Kunming in 2014 where more than 100 civilians were killed in the attack. Fifty civilians were killed in an attack on a coal mine in Aksu in September 2015 (Powers 2014; Hendrix 2016). Thus, it may be an important issue of concern which China would want to address and respond carefully in terms of the Uyghurs which may tarnish its image within the Muslim world and which could potentially transform China where there has been no transnational terrorist attacks linked to Jihad and also into a target for Pakistani based militants (Duchatel 2011: 545).

On August 8, 2016, more than 70 people were killed and over 120 were injured in a suicide attack in Quetta, the capital city of the Balochistan province in Pakistan. As the Gwadar port is in close proximity to Balochistan, this incident highlights the security risks that the CPEC would face. The Quetta attack used a two-step tactic where it first targeted and assassinated Bilal Kasi the President of the Balochistan Bar Association and later on the same day infiltrated into a large crowd of lawyers and journalists who had gathered at the hospital where Bilal Kasi's body was taken following his assassination. The Jamaat-UI-Ahrar a splinter group of the Pakistani Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for these attacks whilst the Islamic State too claimed responsibility towards these attacks. Of particular concern for the security of the Gwadar port is the recruitment of ethnic Baloch Jihadis by the IS who had earlier served in Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Pakistan as they can guide the IS to the safe houses and human smuggling networks which are operated by Karachi based criminal gangs. The primary threat to the Gwadar port and the CPEC's western route highway appears in the form of separatist Balochistan Liberation Front, which has referred to the CPEC as an occupation of the Baloch territory. Earlier this year, the Pakistani intelligence intercepted plots by Afghanistan and India to encourage and assist Baloch violence against the CPEC and allegedly an Indian intelligence agent was arrested in Balochistan (Lim 2016). Violence against the development of the Gwadar port can be traced back to over a decade, when Baloch separatists killed three Chinese engineers in 2004. In April 2015, the BLF killed twenty Pakistani construction workers and a month later when Chinese President addressed the Pakistani Parliament, they BLF attacked a radar station in an attempt to warn both the Chinese and Pakistani governments of their continued presence (Lim 2016). Further north, past Balochistan, the highways of CPEC's Western Route cross into the contested territories claimed by the jihadist militias located in Peshawar and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan-Pakistani border (Hassan, 2016). Chinese projects in Pakistan have long been menaced by these groups. Over a decade earlier, in 2004, two Chinese engineers working on a

hydroelectric dam in South Waziristan were kidnapped by the Taliban, and one of them was killed in the ensuing rescue operation (Masood & Walsh, 2015). Three years after this incident, Chinese workers from a massage parlor in Islamabad were kidnapped by radical Islamists from the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), and furious pressure from the Chinese government forced the Pakistani government to launch a deadly raid on the mosque. The 2007 crackdown on the Lal Masjid had a devastating unforeseen consequence: the jihadist militias in FATA decided to form the Pakistani Taliban, transforming their limited rebellion into a “full-blown insurgency” (Small, 2015: ix-xv; Tankel, 2016:12).

The CPEC and India's Perceptions

Although the feasibility and economic is rather uncertain due to the existing threats coupled with the harsh weather, it is only China which is capable of tackling those challenges and implement a mammoth project such as the CPEC. An important aspect of the CPEC is its capacity to further and deepen the ties between China and Pakistan through which Pakistan would benefit strategically and economically. These developments in terms of China's growing closer relations and its role in South Asian nations have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi and since the year 2013 the UPA led government has protested against the project and stated it as unacceptable. India's rejection of the CPEC is also because the highway passes through the Gilgit-Baltistan which is part of the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Further, the Chinese stand on POK which was neutral which it has referred to as part of Pakistan has raised deep concerns with India. The Indian perspective is informed with predominant perspectives (i) a realist and (ii) a Liberal one. The realists argue that the CPEC is a strategic game changer which could bring about ramifications in the military-strategic front where upgrading the India's military capabilities more particularly in the Indian Ocean which would look to effectively limit Chinese access in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, efforts towards renewing the strategic unity with other South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which seemingly would counter China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) and its more assertive String of Pearls approach are important points to consider from the Indian front.

Thus, from the realist perspective, India should utilize instruments which are at its disposal such as the Research Analysis Wing (RAW) to sabotage the CPEC by possible ground resistance. Since, India is also not in a position to compete with China in terms of economic engagements with Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar or Sri Lanka, it should devise a strategy for the Indian Ocean region which would comprehensively coordinate its policies with South Asia with other countries such as the United States, Japan, and Russia. The second perspective which is based on an accommodationist (neo-liberal) perspective regards Chinese regional economic corridors as a potential opportunity by which India could benefit in terms of curbing terrorism and stabilize Pakistan through economic development. Furthermore, after China was accorded SAARC observer status in the year 2005, it should be noted that its role in the South Asian region cannot be reversed easily. Thus, taking note of the various dimensions of Chinese engagements in the region, the liberals propose to engage with China more particularly in terms of the CPEC and also with respective redlines.

Another point which the liberals propose is the linking of the CPEC with the BCIM-EC so that these two corridors are not built with the idea that they surround India but with India (Beitelmar-Berini 2015: 2-3). While most countries in South Asia have welcomed these initiatives, however, India has been cautious as it sees these Economic corridors as Chinese expansionist agenda in the wider Indo-Pacific region in order to strategically encircle India in the region. Although, relations between the two countries (India and China) have witnessed an incremental change over the last decade where both India and China have engaged on various platforms which includes the recently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), India has had its concerns over contentious issues such as the border disputes which remain unresolved. India is also suspicious about China's relations with Pakistan which in its opinion is aimed at containing India (Ranjan 2015: 6).

Conclusion

The CPEC which is an important economic corridor for the Chinese is indeed facing significant challenges in the form of insurgency and violence contestations over territory in China, India and Pakistan. While the Uyghur insurgency poses significant threats in the South Western province of Xinjiang, the violent activities of Balochistan rebels pose serious challenges to the smooth functioning of the Gwadar port as well as the development of the CPEC. On the Indian front, the Kashmir issue has been a thorn in the flesh where both India and Pakistan have been in recent times engaged in attacking each other. The recent Uri Sector attacks seem to suggest that Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir issue is not going to go down so easily. However, responses from the Indian side towards the Uri attacks in the form of surgical strikes also seem to suggest that India has the capacity to counter such attacks in a much more efficient manner. However, the Chinese involvement in the entire gambit of the aggression by both countries and its stand that both nations work out a negotiated settlement seems to be of importance. In terms of the Indian and Chinese engagement in the security issue, while there has been some efforts to counter insurgency by both these nations. Indian experience in the North East dealing with insurgency can be seen as a significant way in which China can benefit in terms of tackling the Uyghur insurgency in China's Xinjiang province. In return China can exert its influence over Pakistan over the Kashmir issue and help towards solving the problems besieging the two nations in this context. While India and China can mutually contribute to each other, China can, through such initiatives preserve its long term interests in terms of the CPEC and also in terms of its energy security.

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