



ISSN: 2230-9926

Available online at <http://www.journalijdr.com>

IJDR

International Journal of Development Research

Vol. 11, Issue, 07, pp. 48336-48341, July, 2021

<https://doi.org/10.37118/ijdr.22382.07.2021>



REVIEW ARTICLE

OPEN ACCESS

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOTHERAPY: EXISTENTIALIST APPROACH

*¹Myriam Moreira Protasio and ²Ana Maria Lopez Calvo de Feijoo

¹Founding Partner of the Institute of Phenomenological-Existential Psychology of Rio de Janeiro – IFEN

²Associate Professor at UERJ, State University of Rio de Janeiro

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 03rd April, 2021

Received in revised form

20th May, 2021

Accepted 09th June, 2021

Published online 25th July, 2021

Key Words:

Psychology; Psychotherapy;
Phenomenology; Hermeneutics;
Existentialism.

*Corresponding author:

Myriam Moreira Protasio

ABSTRACT

The theme of phenomenological psychotherapies within the existentialist approaches is part of the investigation into clinical psychology from an existentialist perspective, undertaken at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. The main aim of this text is to clarify the phenomenological, hermeneutic and existentialist bases that arise in our clinical practices. To that end, we undertook a narrative review of the literature in order to be able to analyze the elements to be found in the perspectives on psychotherapy classified as phenomenological and existentialist. We arrived at the following conclusions: 1- many so-called existentialist psychotherapies are not phenomenological; 2- psychotherapies with a phenomenological approach are built on the maxim of intentionality; 3- phenomenological and existentialist psychotherapies are built on phenomenology and the philosophy of existence; 4- we introduce a clinical perspective we have developed in our practices with a phenomenological, hermeneutic and existentialist base. The relevance of this study, besides being able to position our clinical perspective, is to clear up several doubts that many psychotherapy academics have about this issue.

Copyright © 2021, Myriam Moreira Protasio and Ana Maria Lopez Calvo de Feijoo. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Myriam Moreira Protasio and Ana Maria Lopez Calvo de Feijoo, 2021. "Phenomenological psychotherapy: Existentialist approach", *International Journal of Development Research*, 11, (07), 48336-48341.

INTRODUCTION

We know that psychology is not a one-sided science. On the contrary, it consists of a diversity of matrixes, as Figueiredo tells us (2000): "Diversity took up residence in the heart of psychology at the very moment the subject was born" (p.195). And, notwithstanding the countless writers who foresaw its unification, whether through methods or theories, this dream has never become a reality. On the contrary, to date the paths have multiplied. What took place in the tradition of psychology as a whole, in its natural-scientific approach, also occurred within the core of existential-phenomenological traditions that take on different ways of doing and saying. As Feijoo asserts (2017), the diversity happening within the core of psychology as a whole would be no different in the field of existential-phenomenological psychologies (p. 20). So the question arises: would this diversity be a defect? Would we need to find a single approach to practicing psychology? What's more, would this be possible?

In this paper we are assuming that diversity is inherent to life and, that being so, we have retained diversity moreover because we do not see it as a weakness, but rather as a timely treasure. Timely because, besides affirming that there are different interpretations of existence, we also appreciate difference.

Moreover, this is the issue we want to deal with in this paper, to begin with, by considering the different approaches of psychology considered existential, until we arrive at the modality of psychology we embrace in our clinical practice.

Psychotherapy is classified as phenomenological in its multiple and varied approaches, from the current of humanism, through existentialism to daseinsanalysis. We will begin our text by looking at what we are defining as the beginnings of existential psychology. We will introduce the humanist perspective in which we have found striking traces of the maintenance of the man-world duality. Although this split emphatically eliminates this perspective from the phenomenological proposal, it has not prevented certain scholars of the matter from embracing it as their guidance in existential psychotherapy. We will also elaborate on existentialist or humanist-existential psychology as coined by Rollo May (1974), by the fact that it is more influenced by the philosophies of existence than by phenomenology itself and because it also engages with the idea of the man-world dichotomy. As a second phase of the paper, in the section entitled *Phenomenology: from philosophy to psychology*, we will address the issues raised by Husserl (1901/2006) regarding the dichotomy and the manner in which he expresses man-world co-originality through intentionality. Thereafter, we will introduce to the dialogue two philosophers of existence, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who moved in the same direction of breaking with dichotomies. And, lastly, we will introduce Daseinsanalysis, given that it radically

* TN: All quotes in this article have been freely translated into English.

distances itself from the man-word dichotomy to the point where it refers to existing as being-in-the-world. Daseinsanalysis is a perspective in psychotherapy that took inspiration from the thinking of Heidegger and which several psychiatrists began to consider in the early 20th century. We wish to point out that we have taken on a clinical task, psychotherapy, which radically distances itself from the humanist and humanist-existential perspectives and which engages in dialog principally with the thinking of Kierkegaard, especially his considerations as to the object of psychology, anxiety. But also with the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger, bearing in mind the idea of a psychology without a subject and the issue of hermeneutics, which indicates that man always consists of the historical horizon on which he finds himself. So, in the section entitled *Elements to be found in our approach to psychotherapy*, we will illustrate how, in the light of previous discussions, we put together the way in which we practice clinical psychology.

The beginnings of existential psychology

We can state that the existential movement in Psychology gains ground in Latin America following the publication of the book *Existencia: nueva dimension en psiquiatría y psicología* (Existence: A new dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology), organized thanks to the efforts of Rollo May, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger (1958/1977). Rollo May (1977), when trying to define what is existentialism, asserts that “in its specific form, it came about precisely a century ago in Kierkegaard’s violent protest against the prevailing rationalism of his time” (p. 29). According to May, during the second half of the 19th century, the existentialist movement was nowhere to be seen and “Kierkegaard went by completely unnoticed” (May 1977, p. 33, note). The movement received a new impulse beginning in 1880, with the work of Dilthey and, above all, Nietzsche. May refers to a third phase of existentialism in the 20th century, “as a result of the impact that the first world war had on the Western world (p.33), when Kierkegaard was back in favor, now materialized in the phenomenology of Husserl, “that offered Heidegger, Jaspers and others the tool they needed to cut at its roots the subject-object dichotomy, which had constituted a source of scandal for both science and philosophy” (p.33).

In the sixties decade of the 20th century, May (1977) argues that the existentialist approach comprises the so-called third force in psychology, representing a trend that differs from the other two forces, the behaviorist and the psychoanalytical, establishing itself as yet another investigative trend in psychology. May dedicates the first two chapters of the book *Existencia: nueva dimension en psiquiatría y psicología* to rebuilding the time when this new perspective arises, the appearance of psychologists and psychiatrists in Europe and the United States who resisted the temptation to both embrace a totally technical attitude to patients, and to start from those determined *a priori*, such as those put forward by psychoanalytical theories and by the position that supported the subject-object split. Jaspers (1967, 1913/1987), Binswanger (1971; 1977; 1987), May (1974, 1977), Victor Frankl (1978; 1989; 1990; 2003) and Irvin Yalom (1980) are names which, in conversation with Kierkegaard and Heidegger, thought about or collaborated to make it possible to consider an exercise in psychology that distanced itself from the rationalist or empirical currents that gained ground from the middle of the 19th century. Those psychiatrists and psychologists were also influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology and by the existential thinking of Heidegger and Sartre in their quests for new paths to understanding the flesh-and-bone patients with whom they dealt with every day. For May (1977), the development of those studies carried out in several countries was a sufficient sign of a need that transcended their countries of origin, uniting them in the search for new dimensions for understanding what happens in the clinic.

In North America, Rollo May (1974; 1977), Thomas Greening (1975), Abraham Maslow (1968), and William Frick, (1975) built a humanist psychology under the influence of the German Romantic movement that elevated emotion over any other element of the human psyche, be it reason, conscience or behavior. Scholars of the humanist

movement in psychology were opposed to all and any scientific criterion for explaining psychic mechanisms. Humanist psychology appears with all its might, indicating that there were other ways of thinking about human existence besides the psychoanalytical and behavioral perspectives. Indeed, with the influence of humanism, psychology began to appreciate man, positioning him as the core aspect of all things, as if defending the maxim that man is the measure of all things. As a result, if on the one hand humanism in psychology breaks with the trend of explaining existence in causal terms, considering it as an intricate game of mechanisms; on the other hand, that psychology retains the man-world dichotomy in order to contrast them. Thus, the world then becomes what in most cases prevents the authentic development of the individual; and it is up to the internal strength of the individual not to let the world question him. The figure of the psychotherapist would be the one who helps that individual questioned by the world to achieve his full potential. To that end, it became necessary for psychotherapists to have achieved their authenticity and to be capable of establishing an unconditional relationship. In our interpretation, humanist and humanistic-existential psychology, while behaving as trends towards constituting another way of thinking about man, unlike the two previous forces – psychoanalysis and behaviorism, still retain at their core the man-world dichotomy. This dichotomy is noticeable for the characteristics to be found in its theories: authenticity and unauthenticity; the priority of man’s potentiality to develop independently of the world; the power of man to transform the world. Husserl (1901/ 2006) was the radically important philosopher to begin establishing the possibility of thinking about the conscience in order to support the break with the man-world split. Husserl, thus, defines the conscience of intentionality, initiating the formulation of phenomenological psychology.

Phenomenology: from philosophy to the psychology of intentionality: Phenomenology appears as a movement that establishes itself amidst the criticisms that were levelled at the tendency of philosophy to separate the subject from the object. The phenomenology of Husserl arises precisely from the attempt to find a thought path that did not relapse into holding one of the poles in esteem, whether the subject or the object. This is the dichotomy that underpins endless theories both in philosophy itself, from idealism to realism, and in psychology, from psychoanalysis to behaviorism. On the other hand, from Plato to Husserl there has been no lack of philosophical proposals to unite man and the world, since they were previously separated. All attempts seemed in vain, sometimes relapsing into idealism, sometimes into realism. The emphasis on one of the poles merely exacerbated the division. What was needed was a genuine encounter with existence, extrapolating all intellectualism, in order to embrace man not as a substance or mechanism, but as existing, emerging. So it was then that, with Husserl, the idea of man-world co-originality arose. To defend the thesis of the inseparability of these two poles, Husserl conceived conscience as intentionality (1901/2006). This scholar defends that conscience always arises in the relationship with the object, without intentionality is this space-time flux. The ego is the synthesis of experiences in space and time. Thus, Husserl (2006) starts investigating the structure of intentionality, from the first to the sixth logical investigation.

Many scholars of psychiatry and psychology proceed to work with the idea of intentionality in order to build their studies about the human psyche. Among the psychiatrists, we can mention Karl Jaspers (1913/1987) who, when writing his *Psicopatología general* (General Psychopathology), applies the phenomenological method and draws on comprehensive psychology based on the teachings of William Dilthey; Von Gebattel (1969), who investigates the failed anankastic attitude as a time-space experience; Eugene Minkowski (1933/1968), who traces the structure of depression through the experience of time; and Ludwig Binswanger (1960/ 1987), who deals with the maniacal world within the experience of space. Among the psychologists, we can mention Aron Gurwitsch (1956), who establishes the link between the psychology of shape and the phenomenology of Husserl. And Frederick Buytendijk (1948/2018), who analyzes the problems of pain and suffering using Husserlian phenomenology. Nowadays in

Brazil, an assertive scholar of phenomenological psychology is Tommy Akira Goto (2006), who defends phenomenological psychology as an eidetic and transcendental science. What lies at the core of Husserl's design is the "crisis of modern subjectivity" (Feijoo, 2011), that is, the emptying of the design of an autonomous and sufficient subject who, anchored in reason, positions objects. This crisis finds a place initially in the philosophy that subsequently came to be known as the philosophy of existence. Writers who, averse to following a scheme in an attempt to prove its veracity, seek that more primary moment that preceded thought, where the split had not yet come about, as the philosophy of Kierkegaard and Heidegger tells us. These are the writers that provide the fundamentals to inspire us in an existential psychology. We will deal with this topic below.

Kierkegaard: in the direction of existential psychology

We will begin by mentioning several writers who referred to Kierkegaard as a psychologist. Sharpless (2012) mentions an excerpt from a letter written in 1881 by Brandes, a well-known writer and literary critic, to Nietzsche, where he says: "In my opinion, he [Kierkegaard] is one of the most profound psychologists who ever lived" (p. 90). Sharpless (2012) also mentions Werner Brock, who had asserted that Kierkegaard was "one of the most remarkable psychologists of all time, in depth, if not in breadth, superior to Nietzsche, and in penetration comparable only to Dostoyevsky" (p. 90). Jaspers (1967) is of a similar opinion, placing Kierkegaard alongside Nietzsche as "capable of illuminating with a sheer light even the last angle of the human soul, and of making it communicable even in its origins" (p. 12). Among the psychiatrists who found in Kierkegaard contributions to their own way of doing things and engaging in clinical practice, we can point to Jaspers and Binswanger. Jaspers embraces, throughout his entire trajectory, the centrality of the thinking of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in developing his own thinking as a psychiatrist, as noted not only in his famous book *Psicopatología general* (Jaspers, 1913/1987), but also in the philosophical course he drew upon as the basis for his clinical practice. In *Psicología de las concepciones del mundo* (Psychology of Worldviews) he says:

When considering the question of primordial worldviews, it occurred to me to seek the great tradition of thinkers that had devised this psychology, not under the name of Psychology, or that had done it only partially. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and afterwards especially Kierkegaard, whom I studied since 1914, and secondarily Nietzsche, were a revelation to me. They were capable of illuminating with a sheer light even the last angle of the human soul, and of making it communicable even in its origins (Jaspers, 1967, p. 12).

Basso (2016) introduces us to the relationship of another writer of the phenomenological and existential tradition with Kierkegaard, psychiatrist Binswanger. The writer shows that Binswanger commences with a structural principle in which Kierkegaard is almost always present, interpreting his clinical situations. As an example, she mentions the Ellen West and Ilse cases, which were interpreted in the light of mental illness (despair), a subject investigated by Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Anti-climacus (Kierkegaard, 2010b). Basso mentions Binswanger himself in the Ilse case:

A great mind has developed both a new philosophical concept of infirmity, and an understanding of insanity as mental illness. We are thinking about Kierkegaard and his concept of The Sickness Unto Death, of "despair" at willing to be oneself and despair at not willing to be oneself. In this "sickness" and in its clever description and theological and philosophical interpretation, we can identify one of the most important contributions to the purely "anthropological" comprehension of certain clinical types of insanity, and particularly, schizophrenia. (Binswanger, cited by Basso, 2016, p. 351)

Thus, we can conclude that Kierkegaard's relationship with the psychology of existential tradition has been consolidated since the

early days when this current was created, whose cornerstone was and continues to be the task of resisting the hegemonic tendencies through objective responses and instruments applicable to the exercise of psychology. When we trace the construction of this thinking in psychology, we can see that the references to Kierkegaard primarily concern his two works: *O conceito de angústia* (The Concept of Anxiety, Kierkegaard, 1844/2010a) and *Desespero humano* (The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard, 1849/2010b); but they also appear, above all in studies carried out in the Estate University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), the texts *A repetição* (Repetition, Kierkegaard, 1843/2009a) and *Temor e tremor* (Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard, 1843/2009 b), as well as several chapters of his monumental opus *Ou-ou* (Either/Or, Kierkegaard 1843/2013).

To achieve the objectives we have set ourselves in this paper, and to list Kierkegaard's contributions to existential psychology, let us dwell on the work *O conceito de angústia* (Kierkegaard, 2010a). Haufniensis, the pseudonym that signs the text, raises the question of ethics, dogmatics and psychology in the ways in which they interpret a phenomenon, pointing out the shortcut of investigations whose starting point is an *a priori* theoretical position. The phenomenon in discussion in this work is sin. For Haufniensis, the starting point for ethics was an ideal that it was possible to live without sin, without taking into account whether a man is in a position to achieve this ideal, which is why that science embraces a judgmental nature. Dogmatics builds from a starting point (the sin of Adam and its propensity for all humanity), a system indifferent to the very way in which men live. By focusing on the system, it surrounds itself with indifference. And psychology? Haufniensis compares it to the work of a police officer who initially needs to closely observe the behavior of several people (a child, two adults, two couples, a family), after which he knows so much about man that he no longer needs to leave home in order to trace the profile of a criminal. Haufniensis takes a critical approach to this way of looking at psychology, pointing to a different understanding based on his interpretation of anxiety. Let's revisit the subtitle of the book, *A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin* by Vigilius Haufniensis, to show that by moving in the direction of the comprehension or psychologically orienting deliberation on sin, the author now addresses the problem presented by dogmatics, which provides support for the other two sciences: ethics, which will judge the sinner, and psychology, which will explain the sin in the individual and, according to Haufniensis, will return the explanation to dogmatics for it to enhance its system. But, upon examining the sin, the original sin, Haufniensis makes a curious discovery. Sin appears in the world *through its possibility*. What does this mean? That dogmatics and ethics cannot grasp the situation of the advent of sin since, either there is a need to suppose it (dogmatics) or a need to explain it (ethics). Well, and this is where what Haufniensis indicates as being the *object of psychology*, anxiety, appears.

Haufniensis (Kierkegaard, 2010a) refers to anxiety (*Angest*) as possibility for the possibility, a power, a being-capable-of which is not determined as something external or from outside, but rather "in the sense that it itself produces anxiety" (p. 163). Anxiety is related to sin in the sense that a person only exists to the extent that they are in the world, that they act (that they sin). Haufniensis (Kierkegaard, 1844/2010a) will show that existing (sinning) means determining oneself effectively in one way, not another, in freedom, in other words, beginning with possibility. What is important to emphasize in terms of the psychology that Haufniensis is preaching is that the object of psychology, anxiety, arises through ways of being and being in the world, that is, not abstractly, metaphysically, ethically or dogmatically. All these approaches are delayed in the sense that firstly, the action is needed (the sin arises – Adam's blushing, for example) so that one can deduct from it morality (ethics) or metaphysics (dogmatics). Thus, psychology is not taken in by explanations, causal relationships, and logical deduction, but rather waits until the phenomenon itself shows or finds its measure, its limits and outlines. That is why we can say that Kierkegaard's psychology is on the edge of the event, never inside or outside it.

The problem the philosopher is pointing at is the total oblivion of the existing in their existence, that is, the oblivion of the implications of every way of existing with the aspect of duration of the existence, totally suffocated in the scientific neutrality of metaphysics, in the indifference of logic and in the idealism of dogmatics that sustain the separation between life and knowledge. It is in the conflict with logic and with systematic thinking that Kierkegaard will work out a way for engaging in science that does not lose sight of existence, which means to say that it does not lose sight of the unique individual in his existence. Protasio (2014) says that "Psychology was the word chosen by Kierkegaard to designate the field of investigation of private human life, or better, unique life, in conflict with the fields of investigation that consider human life as universal" (p. 224). We have concluded that psychology as suggested by Kierkegaard would not abide by the criteria of absolute certainty, systematicity or probability, but would organize itself as communication between men against a background of the essential condition of existence as possibility for possibility. What would be in question, then, would be the individual's relationship with his own existence, with his own truth, and the strength that can arise from this relationship. This psychology would not describe behaviors or build abstract explanations or predictability, but would exist as one in a direct relationship with possibility and which, by taking up a position on the edge of the relationship established with the analysand, would attempt to make the relationship itself appear in as much as it guards the transformational gathering that arises in the field of the relationship itself.

Heidegger and psychology with phenomenological and hermeneutical bases: In the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger (2001) put forward his topics to psychiatrists and psychotherapists so as to defend that it was possible to consider these studies and practices based on hermeneutic phenomenology. From 1959 to 1969, Heidegger got together with scholars of the human psyche to show them that it was possible to think about existence by putting aside the idea of the subject. He begins the seminars by clarifying what he is attempting to do when thinking about man as *Dasein*. *Dasein*, which can be translated as there-being, refers to the initial opening in which existence is always to be found. It is worth pointing out that since 1927, Heidegger (1963/1991) had been striving to clarify the question of being, which to him appeared to be insufficiently clarified and, so, he reverts to Aristotle: "If the being is expressed in multiple meanings, what, then, will be the fundamental significant determinant? What does it mean to be?" (p. 01).

In attempting to frame the question he himself is proposing, Heidegger (1927/1998) decides to erect a fundamental ontology in his famous book *Ser e tempo* (Being and Time). To that end, he begins with the following questions: What is ontology? What is fundamental ontology? How does one build this ontology? Why is there a need to consider another ontology? Ontology, generally speaking, arises from the idea that it is possible to find substance, foundation, absolutization and pure reason in the order of a cause and an effect, thereby achieving the solution to these questions – in the subject-object split, being in itself like something that occurs naturally and independently. As a result, all regional ontologies strive for generalization and the categories of the things with which these ontologies concern themselves – and, so, they need to disregard singularization by asserting categories or properties. And, it is through the considerations above that the scholars of the human psyche put forward their theses on existence, that is, either they support the split, or they try to flee the dichotomy that splits man and the world. To understand how these theses are put forward, we have to make distinctions between the existentiels and categories. There is no doubt that both the existentiels and the categories are determinations, but categories materialize in theory, in properties, in the presence seen or in abstraction, in other words, defining their terms becomes a *sine qua non*. Lastly, categories are born from the setting of a being. The existentiels, in turn, refer to what is the condition of possibility in order for the categories to happen. is what comprises the fundamental ontology as put forward by Heidegger (1927/1998). The fundamental ontology that Heidegger deals with consists of the search

for the most primeval relationships. This is the manner in which Heidegger radicalizes the idea of intentionality. He embarks on this adventure with a question about what real is (*títòón*). Fogel (1998) responds: real means life. Life then comes to be seen as impropriety – falling down in the world – the opening where everything appears on the horizon that initiates multiple meanings. For Heidegger, the elementary index of every possible real is a complex structure with a simple unit known as being-in-the-world (circular structure). Gilvan Fogel (1998) sums it up: "What is real, every possible real is either the extent to which it occurs, or it is for a being that is or exists in determining being within the comprehension of real" (p.133). That being is man who, in his way of being, is there-being.

Existence in Heidegger, given its totally indeterminate initial nature, cannot do without the world, of impersonality, of impropriety, that is, *Dasein* occurs as an irruption, as falling down in the world. And the world is nothing more than the opening where everything is revealed. This is a hermeneutical horizon that initiates meanings. Thus, it is not about considering the personal as a state to be achieved. The personal and the impersonal happen in an existential dynamic always at stake on the horizon on which we find ourselves. To be able to understand the hermeneutical horizon on which we find ourselves and from which we cannot escape, let us revisit what Heidegger (1954/2012) tells us about the technical era. The philosopher makes it clear that on this epochal horizon, technology initiates our being-in-the-world in our essential determination: incessant productivity. Add to this hurry, impatience. It is our belief that through serene thinking we can achieve the determinations that oppress our existence. Several scholars of the human psyche, including the psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss, look to fundamental ontology and to the discussion about the epochal character of existence, as developed by Heidegger, for the foundations of another method of clinical practice. Binswanger (1971,1977), dissatisfied with the scientific and natural bases predominating in the psychiatry studies of his time, finds answers to his queries in the notions of design, caution and impersonality present in *Ser e tempo* (Heidegger, 1927/1998). Medard Boss (1976; 1988) adhered to Binswanger's design, deciding to continue with the drafting of daseinsanalysis. To that end, he added other studies besides those on which Binswanger had embarked, embedding in his daseinsanalysis the works of Heidegger produced after 1930.

Elements present in our approach in psychotherapy: In conclusion, what we have seen arise since Kierkegaard, through to Husserl and Heidegger, is a movement that aspires for a non-natural-scientific method in viewing the phenomenon. This movement in psychology has been referred to as existential-phenomenological, whose aspiration, flying in the face of essentialist currents, persists to this day in the dedication to basing psychology and psychiatry on pillars that are non-scientific, non-deterministic and non-subjectivist. Efforts have been made, introducing psychology into a dialog with philosophy and literature, as argued by Feijoo (2017), a know-how inclinal psychology whose purpose is to create its foundations on other bases and in a way that anchors a thought in psychology that can dispense with the natural-scientific methods and prior comprehensions about man. We can also trace the efforts of Protasio (2015, 2018) who, inspired by Kierkegaard, considers building a psychology that dialogs with the idea of *existential science*, which she refers to as Psychology of the Possible. In this way of thinking about and building the psychological clinic, the analyst-analysand encounter is also considered the fundamental element of everything that happens in the clinic. This encounter is based on men's very constitution as a community, in other words, always being in a relationship. This is what Heidegger referred to as care, the psychological clinic based on the idea that the most primeval thing is care, (*Sorge*) that is, the relational structural unit to which Heidegger (1927/1998) refers.

Thus, we have placed the relationship established in the space of the clinic as the place that supports the possibility of transformation. And this refers to the possibility of achieving the existential measure without any base theory that says what is, after all, the measure that others have to achieve. This is an exercise in allowing the liberating

concern to predominate in the clinic, in which we insist on not providing guidance, paths, without taking the other party's place and telling them, even if indirectly, what they must do. Feijoo (2017) asserts that we can only give what we do not have in what concerns the dynamic realization of life. This is why we are not familiar with private, existential realization. Since we do not have a prior position, we can give each one the opportunity to achieve it. "Giving, then, means opening up a field of possibilities so that each one can achieve the existence that is theirs" (p. 226). A field in which the practitioner, so as not to get carried away by the determinations of the world, must at least face up to the demands of the world in order to understand that which, in impersonality, tells us about how we must be, think and feel. By using, in the clinic, indirect communication (Feijoo, 2000; Protasio, 2015), we do not want yet to indicate paths, by telling the other party directly what they must do and what would be the best path to follow. Indirect communication means nothing, it merely supports the possibility that the other party may dwell more on issues which are theirs. In short, the psychology clinic in an existential approach takes inspiration from Kierkegaard (1843/2001) to argue that this task can take place with patience, so that, with patience, a relationship space is created that enables one to reach one's own fulfilment, both with respect to the analyst and the analysand. In Heidegger (1959) we learn about serenity in order to be in the world, rather than possessed by it.

Conclusion

Ever since Rollo May argued that existential psychology was not just another school, but an approach to human beings and an attitude whose concern was to understand the structure of the human being, many paths have been taken in the sense of elucidating the method of thought that can support phenomenological research, in addition to enabling phenomenological-hermeneutical investigations in clinical practice. By presenting the outcome of the existential psychotherapies, with their divergences and convergences, perhaps we should begin by thinking about which horizon this purpose is born into, while considering that these issues arise within the scope of the claim through equality and the rejection through difference. What is more, this rejection is in fact a rejection of life, which happens in diversity. Han (2017) points out that rejection by what is different is in fact rejection by the other: "the other as mystery, the other as seduction, the other as *eros*, the other as desire, the other as hell, the other as pain..." (p. 9). And that the ground, the field where this rejection arises is fear and alienation. We prefer the illusion of certainty to risk. And the encounter with what is different, whether from the other party or from ourselves, always implies risk, or even better, experience. And Han (2017), drawing on Heidegger, goes on to say: "What constitutes experience in the strong sense is the negativity of the different and transformation. Having an experience with something means that this 'concerns us, drags us, oppresses us, excites us'" (p. 12). Thus, what is different not only introduces us to the other, but opens to us a field for transformation. The manner in which things affect us or drag us down varies, accepting a language that is also diversified. If, in an attempt at leveling, we tend to reduce language to its objectifying and objectifiable aspects, when we encounter something, different other voices appear, voices of philosophy, poetry, literature and art; voices which, by dwelling on their elements, open us up and make us sensitive to the stranger, to the others. This is not about an exclusion, where method and objective thought do not belong, rather it is about accepting other languages in addition to the most objective language, in such a manner that the space for what is new is preserved. Coming back to our theme of diversity in psychology, which we are used to designating as existential, perhaps what is important is for us to consider, in each study, in each article, whether the bases of that way of practicing psychology are properly clarified, exposing their fundamentals and the manner in which these unfold in that specific manner of practicing psychology. We believe that from the protection of this condition, coexisting with differences becomes possible. Furthermore, this coexistence can afford an experience, in other words, it can transform us.

REFERENCES

- Basso, E. 2016. A influência de Kierkegaard no pensamento de Binswanger. In *Psicopatologia: Fenomenologia, literatura e hermenêutica* (Myriam Moreira Protasio, Trans.). Rio de Janeiro: IFEN, pp. 327–368.
- Binswanger, L. (1971). *Introduction à l'analyse existentielle*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. (Original published in 1957).
- Binswanger, L. (1977). *Artículos y conferencias escogidas*. (Mariano Marín Casero, Trad.). Madrid: Editorial Gredos. (Original published in 1955).
- Binswanger, L. (1987). *Mélancolie et manie: études phénoménologiques*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (Original published in 1960)
- Boss, M. (1976). *Análise Existencial – Daseinsanalyse: Como a Daseinsanalyse entrou na psiquiatria*. *Revista Daseinsanalyse*, (2), 5-23.
- Boss, M. (1988). *Angústia, culpa e liberdade*. São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades.
- Buytendijk, F. (1948/2018). A problemática da dor: psicologia – fenomenologia-metafísica. In *Phenomenological Studies – Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica*, XXIV (1): 101-103, Jan-Apr 2018.
- Feijoo, A. M. L. C. (2000) *A escuta e a fala em psicoterapia: uma proposta fenomenológico-existencial*. São Paulo: Vetor.
- Feijoo, A.M. (2011). *A existência para além do sujeito*. Rio de Janeiro: ViaVerita.
- Feijoo, A.M. (2017). *Existência & Psicoterapia: da Psicologia ao objeto ao saber-fazer em psicologia clínica*. Rio de Janeiro: IFEN.
- Figueiredo, L. C. (2000). *Matrizes do pensamento psicológico*. Petrópolis: Vozes.
- Fogel, G. (1998). *Da solidão perfeita: escritos de filosofia*. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
- Frankl, V. E. (1978) *Fundamentos Antropológicos da Psicoterapia*. (Renato Bittencourt, Trans.) Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores.
- Frankl, V. E. (1989) *Um Sentido para a Vida*. (Victor Hugo Silveira Lapenta, Trans.). Aparecida, SP: Editora Santuário.
- Frankl, V. E. (1990) *A Questão do Sentido em Psicoterapia*. (Jorge Mitre, Trans.). Campinas, SP: Papyrus.
- Frankl, V. E. (2003) *Psicoterapia e Sentido da Vida*. (Alípio Maia de Castro, Trans.). São Paulo: Quadrante.
- Frick, W. B. (Org.) (1975) *Psicologia Humanista. Entrevistas com Maslow, Murphy e Rogers*. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores.
- Gebattel, V. (1969). *Imago hominis*. (Beatriz Romero, Trans.). Madrid: Gredos.
- Goto, T. A. (2006). *Introdução à Psicologia Fenomenológica – A nova Psicologia de Edmund Husserl*. São Paulo: Paulus.
- Greening, T. (Org.) (1975). *Psicologia existencial-humanista* (1ª edição). Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores.
- Gurwitsch, A. (1957). La última obra de Edmund Husserl. In *Leciones y Ensayos*. Buenos Aires: 6 (7), p. 7-25.
- Han, B.-C. (2017). *La expulsión de lo distinto*. Barcelona: Herder Editorial.
- Heidegger, M. (1959). *Serenidade*. Lisboa: Instituto Piaget. Maria Madalena Andrade & Olga Santos, Trans.). Lisboa: Instituto Piaget.
- Heidegger, M. (1991). *Meu caminho para a fenomenologia*. In *Os Pensadores* (Original published in 1963)
- Heidegger, M. (2001). *Seminários de Zollikon*. (Arnhold, G., & Prado, M. F., Trans.). Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes. (Original published in 1987).
- Heidegger, M. (2012). *Ensaio e conferências*. (Emanuel Carneiro Leão, Gilvan Fogel & Márcia Schuback, Trans.). Petrópolis: Vozes; Bragança Paulista: Editora Universitária São Francisco. (Original published in 1954).
- Heidegger, M. (1998). *Ser e tempo*. (Márcia de Sá Cavalcanti, Trans.). Petrópolis: Vozes. (Original published in 1927).
- Husserl, E. (2006). *Investigações lógicas* (Vols. 1-2). (P. Alves & C. Marujão, trans.). Lisboa: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa. (Original work published in 1901).
- Jaspers, K. (1967). *Psicología de las concepciones del mundo*. (Mariano Marín Casero, trans.) Madrid, Editorial Gredos.
- Jaspers, K. (1987). *Psicopatologia Geral: psicología compreensiva*,

- explicativa e fenomenologia, São Paulo: Atheneu. Samuel Pena Reis, Trans.). RJ/SP: Atheneu. (Original published in 1913).
- Kierkegaard, S. (2001). *Dois discursos edificantes de 1844*. (Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Trans.). Petrópolis: Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl. (Original published in 1844)
- Kierkegaard, S. A. (2009a). *A Repetição*. (J. M. Justo, Trans.) Lisboa: Relógio D'Água. (Original published in 1843)
- Kierkegaard, S. A. (2009b). *Temor e Tremor*. (E. M. Sousa, Trans.) Lisboa: Relógio D'Água. (Original published in 1843)
- Kierkegaard, S. A. (2010 a). *O Conceito de Angústia*. (Á. L. Valls, Trans.) Petrópolis - São Paulo, RJ - SP: Vozes - Editora Universitária São Francisco. (Original published in 1844)
- Kierkegaard, S. A. (2010b). *O desespero humano*. (A. C. Monteiro, Trans.) São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Editora Unesp. (Original published in 1849)
- Kierkegaard, S. A. (2013) *Ou - ou, Um fragmento de vida (primeira parte)*. (Elisabete M. de Sousa, Trans.) Lisboa: Relógio D'Água. (Original published in 1843)
- Maslow, A. H. (1968). *Introdução à psicologia do ser*. (Álvaro Cabral, Trans.). (1st edition). Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Eldorado.
- May, R. (1974). *Arte do aconselhamento psicológico*. (Ernani Pereira Xavier, Trad.) (1^a edição). Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes.
- May, R.; Angel, E & Ellenberger, H. (1977). *Existencia: nueve dimensiones en psiquiatría y psicología*. (C. S. Gil, Trans.) (1^a edición). Madrid: Gredos. (Original work published in 1958).
- Minkowski, E. (1968). *Le temps vécu*. Paris: Delaxaux et Nestle. (Original published in 1933).
- Protasio, M. M. (2014). A Psicologia Indicada por Kierkegaard em Algumas de suas obras. In *Phenomenological Studies – Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica*, Volume XX - N. 2 – Jul/Dec 2014, p. 223-230.
- Protasio, M. M. (2015). *O simesmo e as personificações da existência finita: comunicação indireta rumo a uma ciência existencial*. Rio de Janeiro: IFEN.
- Protasio, M. M. (2018). *Kierkegaard e a Psicologia do Possível*. Publication by the Laboratory of Studies in Existential Phenomenology and Practice in Psychology, IP-USP. Rio de Janeiro: IFEN (in press).
- Sharpless, B. A. (2012). Kierkegaard's Conception of Psychology. (A. P. Association, Ed.) *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 90-106. doi:10.1037/a0029099
- Yalom, I. D. (1980) *Existential Psychotherapy*. USA: Basic Books.
