



ISSN: 2230-9926

Available online at <http://www.journalijdr.com>

IJDR

International Journal of Development Research
Vol. 15, Issue, 09, pp. 69145-69150, September, 2025
<https://doi.org/10.37118/ijdr.30043.09.2025>



RESEARCH ARTICLE

OPEN ACCESS

DIFFERENT LABOR REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS — ONE SOLUTION?

***Dr. Pablo Gutiérrez Castorena**

Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 14th June, 2025
Received in revised form
07th July, 2025
Accepted 26th August, 2025
Published online 30th September, 2025

Key Words:

Labor justice, Labor regulatory institutions,
Labor resolutions.

*Corresponding author:

Dr. Pablo Gutiérrez Castorena,

ABSTRACT

This study presents how the labor reform promoted by progressive governments in Mexico since 2019 has influenced local statistics in terms of the resolution of labor and union disputes by the Aguascalientes Labor Conciliation Center. The historical trend of conflict resolution between capital and labor was interrupted by the creation of a new labor conciliation institute, as labor mediators are now part of the country's judicial branch, making labor justice faster and more expeditious. Such changes have been reflected in a new historical statistical behavior in labor matters.

Copyright©2025, Dr. Pablo Gutiérrez Castorena. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Citation: Dr. Pablo Gutiérrez Castorena. 2025. "Different labor regulatory institutions — One Solution?". *International Journal of Development Research*, 15, (09), 69145-69150.

INTRODUCTION


This comparative statistical article on the manners of resolving labor and union disputes by the labor regulation institutions of Aguascalientes—the Local Conciliation and Arbitration Board (JLCA) and the Labor Conciliation Center of the State of Aguascalientes (CCLE)—presents the extent to which local indicators in labor justice shifted. The objective is to show how the new labor legal framework, enacted in 2019, altered the historical trend in the resolution of conflicts between capital and labor within companies in Aguascalientes by labor regulatory institutions. Results presented in this article show that the new labor justice system in the state of Aguascalientes, carried out by the CCLEA, broke the historical trend of simulation previously practiced by the JLCA, in such a way that the new labor judges now appear to act more cautiously when issuing their rulings on labor disputes between capital and labor. Therefore, the following lines present a set of graphs that show the new trends in the resolution of labor and union disputes by labor regulatory institutions in the state.

Out-of-court labor agreements, labor disputes, strike notices, and strikes, according to the Labor Conciliation Centers of the State of Aguascalientes: Settling labor disputes in Mexico's Local Conciliation and Arbitration Boards (JLCA's) has always been specific to each state. However, in Aguascalientes, labor disputes were resolved by this labor regulatory institution based on the severity of the situation, according to the interests of employers. That is, if the labor dispute had the potential to affect the employer

economically, those responsible for administering labor justice, acting under the orders of the governor in office, resolved the case in a manner that either avoided any impact on the employer or minimized it as much as possible. Other studies by the author have documented how those responsible for administering labor justice operated in favor of employers' interests: if the dispute was an individual case, it was resolved legally (according to federal labor law); if the case was collective or even involved a strike, the resolution was political in nature¹. The following graphs show the historical trends for each type of labor dispute in Aguascalientes, illustrating how they were resolved at the time. In contrast, the trend partially changed from 2020 onwards due to the new labor legal framework that came into effect in the state in 2021 at the Labor Conciliation Center. Therefore, the presentation of statistical results will begin with a graph containing national data showing the growth of so-called labor disputes involving *out-of-court labor agreements*. Such procedure involves the workers submitting their dispute with the employer to the JLCA, presenting the alleged labor violation to the authorities responsible for resolving it. Those responsible for resolving these cases were initially required to call the parties in conflict and attempt to mediate and reach a settlement agreement. If the parties reached an agreement at that stage, the case would be deemed resolved; otherwise, the matter would move on to another stage involving greater legal status, in accordance with current labor law. This second

¹This had to be resolved through the denial of the legality of the strike to prevent reaching what is known as the justification stage. This implied that the strike could be extended indefinitely, forcing the employer to comply with the conditions demanded by the employees.

stage is known as an *out-of-court labor agreement*². In this situation, the plaintiff workers requested that the labor authorities intervene on their behalf to seek fairer mediation and settlement agreement for them, based on the impact on the workers' employment. An examination of Graph #1, presenting national data from the administrative records of the JLCA regarding cases of out-of-court labor agreements, reveals an upward trend in this phenomenon for the period 1995–2018. The phenomenon of conflicts between capital and labor at the individual level can be seen to increase considerably, to the point that the peak of the curve reaches over 596,000 cases—a notably high figure that begins its steep rise in 2007 and reaches its maximum in 2018. The graph itself shows something interesting starting in the year of the change in federal executive powers, with the arrival in power of a progressive left-wing party: the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). At this time, the historical statistical trend shows a considerable break, as the number of cases of this type of labor dispute fell from 596,576 in 2019 to just 353,000 in 2020. In 2019, Mexico approved the labor reform promoted by the MORENA party in both chambers of the legislative branch. The law began to be implemented across the states of the Mexican Republic in a differentiated manner starting in 2020. However, the COVID-19 pandemic also emerged in April of the same year. The three events mentioned above (the change in federal government, the 2019 labor reform, and the pandemic) ultimately influenced this type of labor dispute in Mexican companies, all of which were to be resolved in the JLCA. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the upward trend of this labor phenomenon was in some way affected up to 2019. The behavior of the statistical curve now appears different, as it stabilizes within the range of 350,000 to 402,000 cases, which represents a reduction of approximately 240,000 cases recorded in the labor regulatory institutions, specifically in Conciliation Centers. It remains to examine this type of labor dispute at the local level in the state of Aguascalientes.




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

Graph #2 presents a regional overview of the historical statistical behavior (1995–2023) of out-of-court labor conflicts at the level of the states that comprise the central-western region of the country: Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Guanajuato, and Aguascalientes. The graph also shows the upward trend of the curves for each of the states. Guanajuato ranks first in the number of labor dispute cases involving out-of-court labor agreements, while Zacatecas has the lowest number of cases. What is particularly noteworthy about this graph is that it allows us to gauge the degree of labor conflict in the region, which can also be interpreted as the manner in which workers respond to violations committed by employers in this central-western area. Focusing solely on Aguascalientes, it appears to be a state with a lower level of labor conflict, in which the labor authorities responsible for administering labor justice have little work compared to the rest of the states in the geographical area (see Graph # 2). When analyzing Graph #3 regarding this same indicator, referred to as pre-trial labor agreements³ from 2020 to 2023, the historical curve tended to reverse.

²In this case, each labor conflict was recorded by the JLCA and statistically accounted for to be consolidated and published in INEGI's statistical yearbooks as administrative records in Mexico.


³With the 2019 labor reform, what was previously called out-of-court labor agreements is now referred to as pre-trial labor agreements, whose main task is

From 2000 to 2019, the curve tended to rise, but starting in 2020, all matters concerning the resolution of pre-trial labor agreements were resolved through a new legal framework and followed a new historical trend. This fact is noteworthy because one or more variables influenced the historical curve data for pre-trial labor agreements, which is now negative.



*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

The only factor that may account for such historical trend taking this course is that individual labor disputes were resolved at the conciliation center during the initial stage of conflict reception, when workers filed their cases at the conciliation center offices, as stipulated by the new law. This implies that labor judges engaged in conciliation and resolution in a way that workers and employers reached an agreement without it escalating to the stage of a pre-trial labor agreement. Only this can explain the historical statistical trend change shown in the graph (See Graph # 3).




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

The following graph allows us to notice two important things at first glance. First, in the years 2017, 2022, and 2023, the number of labor conflict cases involving out-of-court labor agreements, as well as those now known as pre-trial agreements, was reduced. The national political climate, the pandemic, and other variables ultimately influenced this reduction. Second, when looking at the graph organized by the reasons workers approached both the JLCA and the Aguascalientes Conciliation Center to present their labor disputes before local conflict-regulating authorities, data suggest that employers modified their behavior toward employees. It appears that employers took a different stance toward their workers due to the new national political and legal labor context. Evidence for this claim lies in the fact that most labor disputes in the state of Aguascalientes are cases of contract termination and voluntary resignation—categories which, in earlier times, were classified by the JLCA as unjustified dismissal and contract rescission. These cases represent the most prevalent form of labor abuse committed by employers in Aguascalientes. Such reduction in cases of pre-trial labor agreements reflects, according to the reasons listed in the graph, a change in the


to achieve conciliation and resolution of conflicts between capital and labor.

stance of employers to implement discretionary strategies toward workers of a different nature. This is largely because employers noticed that labor judges were no longer at their service and no longer depended on the state executive branch; rather, they were now judges of the judicial branch. Even judges could be penalized for omissions or negligence in resolving labor disputes in a biased manner (See Graph # 4).



*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

Labor disputes and their resolution by the Labor Conciliation Center of the State of Aguascalientes (CCLEA): This section discusses labor disputes in the state of Aguascalientes and their resolution by labor regulatory institutions. Statistical data published by INEGI were consulted, based on the administrative records provided by the JLCA and the Labor Conciliation Center of the State of Aguascalientes (CCLEA), to analyze the statistical behavior of labor disputes recorded in the state's labor regulatory institutions. These disputes declined from 4,163 cases in 2020 to 3,708 in 2021, and then to only 1,839 cases in 2023 (See Graph # 5). This graph is particularly noteworthy, as it illustrates how the new legal framework for labor in Mexico influences the absolute number of recorded labor disputes. Moreover, the number of labor disputes in companies in Aguascalientes decreased significantly from 4,163 cases in 2020 to just 1,839 in 2023. This indicates that the Labor Conciliation Center of Aguascalientes, in response to the assignment of its new tasks, functions, and goals established by labor judges, influenced the early resolution process of worker-employer disputes⁴ to such an extent that it became a primary filter, which in turn had an impact on the total number of labor conflicts in the state (See Graph #5).




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources

The following graph verifies the previous statement by presenting the total number of labor disputes resolved in the state of Aguascalientes. These disputes, resolved at the Aguascalientes Labor Conciliation

⁴This consists of seeking an initial conciliation and resolution between workers and employers at the offices of the local conciliation center (this moment is not statistically considered, that is, it is not recorded as such). If, in this first stage, the parties do not reach an agreement, then the process advances to what is known as pre-trial labor agreements (this stage is considered and recorded as a conflictual event between capital and labor). And if the parties in conflict fail to reach an agreement, then the conflict escalates to the labor lawsuit stage. At this point, the conflict is recorded by the local labor conciliation center, and its record is submitted, along with many similar cases, as annual statistics to INEGI, to be published as annual administrative records.

Center, experienced an upward trend. In 2023, they recorded a substantial increase, nearly matching the figures from 2017 and 2018, which at the time had been resolved by the JLCA of Aguascalientes (See Graph #6)⁵.




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

However, the issue of labor disputes resolved by the JLCA and the CCLEA in Aguascalientes, Mexico, becomes particularly interesting when examining the types of resolutions and the historical trends observed in recent years. What this study aims to show is whether Mexico's new labor regulatory institution, the CCLEA, truly delivers labor justice or merely pretends to do so, as the JLCA did in its day. Graph #7, presented below, shows the types of resolutions applied by the CCLEA for all labor dispute cases in companies. Each type of resolution historically shows a trend variation depending on the case. For instance, if the spirit of the 2019 labor reform was that labor regulatory institutions and their authorities should seek permanent conciliation of the parties in conflict, then resolution through *agreements would be expected* to decline over the period from 2017 to 2023. Hard data indicates otherwise; when looking at the type of arbitration award, the 2019 labor law reform did not reflect this statistical behavior as such. The situation is different, however, in the case of the number of withdrawals filed by workers, as the curve shows an upward tendency in 2023. Workers appeared to perceive that pursuing either a settlement or an arbitration award in their dispute with the employer did not represent an effective solution to the claim filed before the CCLEA, even though resolution times had then been significantly reduced (ranging from six months to one year). Something happened which made workers decide to drop their lawsuit. Then there is the case of conflict resolution through *expiration*. In this case, labor law establishes that if, within six months, the worker does not follow up on the claim, the judges have the possibility of considering the case as 'expired.' What is unusual here is that in 2023 the number of this type of resolution increases slightly. Finally, there are cases resolved through incompetence and accumulation. Incompetence refers to situations in which the judge declares a lack of jurisdiction over the claim filed by the worker, as it contains no elements related to labor matters, for example. Accumulation refers to cases that remain pending and are to be resolved through one of the previously discussed mechanisms (See Graph # 7).

Arguably, the type of solution implemented by the new labor authorities responsible for regulating labor disputes in Aguascalientes has not yielded the expected results. A review of the historical statistics on labor agreements shows a consistent decline in agreements reached between the parties in conflict, dropping from over 1,400 cases in 2017 to 1,000 in 2023. This reflects a downward trend from a statistical standpoint. An examination of resolutions of the arbitration award type reveals that the Federal Labor Law reform of 2019 did not produce the anticipated outcomes, as their numbers remained constant over the years. On the other hand, withdrawal


⁵It should be noted that the difference between the cases of resolved labor conflicts shown in Graph #6 and those corresponding to Graph #5 of labor conflicts is due to the fact that each labor conflict may involve one or more workers as claimants. This is the reason for the considerable difference between one figure and the other.

resolutions exhibit a rising historical trend that contradicts the reform’s aim of securing greater labor justice for workers as a means to reduce the frequency with which they withdrew their claims. Data suggest that this expectation was not fulfilled. The remaining types of resolution—expiration, incompetence, and accumulation—are not statistically relevant, since the historical numbers shown in the graphs are not significant so far (See Graph #7).



*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

Agreement, final arbitration award, arbitration award, mixed arbitration award, unspecified, withdrawal, expiration, other, unspecified. On the other hand, it was possible to obtain disaggregated statistics on labor dispute resolutions through arbitration awards, classified as acquittal, sentencing⁶ and mixed. This shows the type of arbitration award that labor judges in the CCLEA have most often used to resolve labor disputes. Graph #8 shows some interesting results regarding the way labor judges and adjudicators proceed in resolving claims filed by workers against employers before labor regulation institutions over a six-year period, both in Aguascalientes and nationwide in Mexico. For example, regarding the historical trend of the column referring to acquittals from the period 2017 to 2023, these favor employers, since labor judges release them from the claims filed by workers. When observing the green column for the year 2017 in comparison with that of 2023, it can be confirmed that the cases increased by 100%.




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

However, sentences issued by judges in favor of plaintiffs have declined since 2019, falling from 550 cases to just over 200 in 2023 (See Graph #8). These statistical results are relevant because they reveal a labor reality that is unfavorable to workers in the field of

⁶Acquittal award: Resolution issued by the Special Board, establishing acquittals in favor of the defendant. 38. Sentencing Award: Resolution issued by the Special Board, establishing a sentence against the Defendant. See: https://www.google.com/search?q=laudo+absolutorio+en+materia+laboral&oeq=laudo+absol&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqBwgCEAAyGAYqBwgAEAAyGAYqBggBEEUYOTIHCAIQABiABDIICAMQABgWGB4yCAGEEAAyFhgeMggIBRAAGBYHjIICAYQABgWGB4yCggHEAAyGAYqogQyCggIEAAyGAYqogQyCggJEAAyGAYqogTSAQg4NDQ3ajBqOagCALACAA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

resolutions by means of arbitration awards, as statistical outcomes that provide them with greater benefits would be expected. Finally, the cases of mixed arbitration awards issued by the judges of the CCLEA increased over the years, reflecting a legal practice in which judges act in a corporative and simulated manner in favor of employers. If these cases were entirely condemnatory, the graph would show a very different scenario where the labor judges’ rulings would be favorable to the workers, which is not the case. On the other hand, when analyzing the cases of collective labor disputes resolved by the JLCA and, more recently, by the Aguascalientes Labor Conciliation Center (CCLEA), the data presented in the following graph are particularly noteworthy. Specifically, based on a statistical record spanning 23 years, it is observed that only 10 collective labor disputes were filed before the labor regulation institutions in Aguascalientes. Of these, eight were addressed by the JLCA, while only four were handled by the newly established labor regulation body in Aguascalientes, the CCLEA (see Graph #9). The data presented in Graph #9 leads to a preliminary conclusion regarding the impact of union corporatism and state corporatism, as well as the control these forces continue to exert over workers. Specifically, the fact that over a span of more than twenty-three years, only ten cases of collective labor disputes have been reported. This scarcity of cases suggests that the logic of state corporatism, which characterized the JLCA, continues to shape the actions of CCLEA judges. It is, therefore, striking that within such an extended timeframe, the number of recorded cases remains so limited. Moreover, conciliation procedures promoted by the labor judges of the CCLEA prevent such conflicts from escalating to the level of strike notices and actual strike outbreaks—a situation that ultimately benefits employers. As a result of this practice, even the unions in Aguascalientes no longer resort to strike notices to pressure employers during collective bargaining negotiations, much less pursue collective actions that could lead to the outbreak of a strike.




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

Strike notices and strike outbreaks in Aguascalientes: a new form of resolution and/or simulation by labor judges: The foregoing is corroborated by the following graph, which illustrates the negative historical trend in the records of strike notices filed by unions before the JLCA and the CCLEA of Aguascalientes. Data clearly reveal that the only union action of filing a strike notice—which, until 2019, was carried out largely at a merely formal⁷ level by unions in Aguascalientes—has now almost entirely ceased. Accordingly, it may be argued that strike notices have become little more than a nominal union practice, as evidenced in the statistics of Graph #10, where it is confirmed that the number of recorded cases is negligible and largely attributable to so-called unions⁸.

⁷A strike notice was requested in writing before the JLCA by the unions. The problem is that recently, unions in Aguascalientes have not been filing strike notices to carry out the act of collective bargaining. The underlying objective of this new non-practice is that it spares the employer from leaving a record of the progress achieved in union collective bargaining when signing the agreements established in the collective bargaining contract registered with the JLCA. This practice is attributed to unions known as *protectionist unions*, which safeguard the employer’s interests rather than those of the workers.

⁸This is the term given to those unions in Aguascalientes that emerged from the transformation of the so-called *collective protection contracts* into what is now known as *protectionist unions* because of the new legal labor framework




*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

Finally, Graph #11 presents empirical evidence of the existence of the so-called collective protection contracts⁹ during the neoliberal period (up to 2019), as well as of the so-called protectionist unions, which have proliferated nationwide—and likewise in Aguascalientes—since 2021. Moreover, the graph offers an interpretation of the behavior of labor regulatory institutions before and after this shift, revealing how state power, through union corporatism and corporate practices carried out for decades by successive governments, maintained a record of containing union struggle in the state. This has been the case because 42 years passed without a single strike being carried out in the state. Of the eight union strike actions initiated, four have been undertaken by the workers of the Universidad Autónoma de Aguascalientes (UAA), and only four within local companies in Aguascalientes. Of these, merely two have occurred since 2022, representing a truly minimal number (see Graph #11). The aforementioned data, when observed by any international capital, would be considered as a factor in the decision to locate investments within the territory of Aguascalientes. Graph #11, together with the preceding graphs, demonstrates that the union corporatism of the labor centers in Aguascalientes, along with the state corporatism exercised by local governments, have succeeded in maintaining control, domination, and, most importantly, the containment of union actions related to strike notices and strike outbreaks. This has occurred despite the establishment of the Federal Center for Labor Conciliation (CFCL) in the state of Aguascalientes. Both forms of corporatism, rooted in PRI and PAN political traditions, navigated the new labor law framework imposed by the progressive left-wing federal governments in power. This was achieved through the widespread emergence of protectionist unions, which have replaced the protection contracts that were eliminated under the new federal labor legislation. Falling indicators of strike notices and strike outbreaks reflect the ongoing neoliberal orientation of the state government (under PAN), reinforced by its alignment with labor centers and business chambers that have relied heavily on protection

in Mexico (the 2019 labor reform). This reform obliges all unions registered with the CCLEA to carry out an annual vote among their members and affiliates to decide whether they agree with the current collective bargaining contract. The purpose of this contract review is to ensure the presence of a union within the company. Consequently, this has led to the disappearance of simulated unions in companies (*collective protection contracts*), but not to the pursuit of authentic unions, as shown in Graph #10 and even Graph #11. In this way, it can be observed that over the last three years, many unions have been registered with the Federal Conciliation Center; but in practice, union life within companies and collective bargaining continue to be simulated, since strike notices are no longer filed and strikes have not occurred, as might have been expected.

⁹Beyond this empirical data, there are complete texts that demonstrate both the existence of this type of unionism and the magnitude it reached throughout the national territory. See works such as: *Contratos colectivos de protección en Aguascalientes (Collective Protection Contracts in Aguascalientes)*, published by UAA; *Democracia y cambio sindical en México (Democracy and Union Change in Mexico)*, published by Plaza y Valdés and Casa Abierta al Tiempo; *La construcción del control obrero e industrialización en Aguascalientes: contribución al análisis de la localización industrial (The Construction of Labor Control and Industrialization in Aguascalientes: Contribution to the Analysis of Industrial Location)*, published by UAA; and *Política pública y relaciones industriales de aglomeración industrial en Aguascalientes, México (1995–2014) (Public Policy and Industrial Relations of Industrial Agglomeration in Aguascalientes, Mexico [1995–2014])*, published by UAA.

contracts. Such evidence suggests an ongoing tradition of worker-control mechanisms implemented by official corporatist unionism, aimed at preventing employers from having to respond to strike notices in collective bargaining processes or from facing actual strike outbreaks in factories due to breaches of collective labor contracts by management.



*Graph developed by the author with INEGI sources.

CONCLUSION

A review of the statistical evidence provided by INEGI, whether through statistical yearbooks and/or databases extracted from the institution's portal, reveals a series of results that partly reflect the performance of two labor regulatory institutions in the state: the Local Board of Conciliation and Arbitration (JLCA) and the Labor Conciliation Center of the State of Aguascalientes (CCLEA). Several elements can be highlighted regarding the manner in which the JLCA addressed each case of labor and union conflict, in contrast to the approach currently undertaken by the CCLEA with respect to these same matters. First, the resolution of individual labor conflicts—specifically, contract termination (better known as unjustified dismissal), voluntary resignation (contract rescission), among others—is now sought through the conciliation of interests between the parties in conflict, mediated by a labor judge who is part of the judicial branch. Second, the time required to resolve each case of labor conflict. This factor is crucial because it directly influences the types of resolutions reached in labor regulation institutions. In this regard, the resolution period must not exceed six months for out-of-court labor agreements, now referred to as pre-trial processes under the reformed Federal Labor Law, and a maximum of one year for cases that proceed to the status of a formal labor claim. This process led to most workers' claims being resolved almost immediately, as judges actively pursue conciliation between the parties. Third, the actions of trade unions with respect to strike notices, whether for the purpose of negotiating revisions to wages and benefits (collective bargaining) or, alternatively, in cases where the employer has failed to comply with the collective labor agreement. The fourth element relates to the actual outbreak of union strikes, crucial for understanding two key issues: first, the extent to which mechanisms of labor control continue to operate in favor of employers; and second, why local state governments persist in promoting abroad the notion that, within the territory of Aguascalientes, there is virtually no collective labor action that might disrupt the productive activity of potential investments. It may be concluded at this point that the adjudicative functions formerly carried out by the JLCA, and those now performed by the CCLEA and the Federal Center for Labor Conciliation and Registration (CFCLRA), remain broadly similar in general terms. The key difference lies in the fact that these two newer institutions of labor regulation are bound by specific legal obligations regarding the resolution of labor disputes and collective union claims. This condition, now mediated by a labor judge within the judicial branch, has had a positive impact on conciliation processes in conflicts between capital and labor. To such an extent that employers facing lawsuits no longer enjoy the nearly unconditional support once afforded to them during the neoliberal period by the JLCA of Aguascalientes; rather, they must now comply with the rulings issued by judges, which are applied immediately in each case involving

disputes with their workers and unions. Through interviews with key informants, the next chapter of this research will examine the current functions and obligations of labor judges. Furthermore, the chapter will present the structure of labor institutions in Aguascalientes and the prevailing approaches to resolving labor disputes.

REFERENCES

Acquittal award: Resolution issued by the Special Board, establishing acquittals in favor of the defendant. 38. Sentencing Award: Resolution issued by the Special Board, establishing a sentence against the Defendant. See: https://www.google.com/search?q=laudo+absolutorio+en+materia+laboral&oq=laudo+absol&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqBwgCEAAYgAQyBwgAEAAAYgAQyBggBEEUYOTIHCAIQABiABDIICAMQABgWGB4yCAGEEAAyFhgeMggIBRAAGBYHjIICAYQABgWGB4yCggHEAAyAQYogQyCggIEAAYgAQYogQyCggJEAAYgAQYogTSAQg4NDQ3ajBqOagCALACAA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

Gutierrez, Pablo y Gutiérrez, Aristides. (2023) Out-of-court labor agreements in the Mexican labor regulatory institutions of the neoliberal period. *International Journal of Development Research*. Vol. 13, Issue, 01, pp. 61283-61293, January, 2023.

Gutierrez, Pablo y Gutiérrez, Aristides. (2023) The resolution of labor disputes in Mexican labor regulatory institutions of the Neoliberal Period (2007-2020) (part two)", *International Journal of Development Research*. Vol. 13, Issue, 06, pp. 63308-63319, July, 2023

INEGI. Statistical yearbooks from 1995 to 2023.
